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ABSTRACT 
Structural and Return Characteristics of Mid-Capitalization Firms: A Study Into the Myth 
Around the Superior Returns of Mid-Size Stocks 
By 
Lane Alex Steinberger 
May 2016 
 
Committee Chair: Wesley Johnston 
Major Academic Unit: J. Mack Robinson College of Business 
 
Over the years there has been significant research around the misspecification of 
the Capital Asset Pricing Model (CAPM), which challenges the linear relationship 
between beta and market returns.  One of the biggest challenges relates to the “small-
firm effect,” which states there are two classifications of stocks (large and small) and 
that the companies with small-market capitalizations have higher returns.  However, the 
definition of a small-cap is vague and there has been little focus in academia on the 
stocks in the middle-market capitalization deciles.  Despite this, institutional and retail 
investors created the “mid-cap” category in the early 1990s and, since then, the risk-
adjusted returns have been exceptional, relative to small- and large-cap stocks.  This 
study examined mid-cap stocks from an academic perspective and delves into the “mid-
cap myth” by evaluating the category over the past 85 years to answer the question 
around whether mid-caps are superior to other asset class.  The results revealed that 
the highly touted and advertised mid-cap stock performance premium during the 1980-
2013 time period was statistically insignificant.  Moreover, mid-caps did have superior 
ix 
risk-adjusted returns over the extended time period studied (1928 to 2014); however, 
these superior returns relative to small-caps were not driven by the uniqueness of the 
mid-sized companies, but by the underperformance of small-cap stocks, specifically 
small-cap growth stocks.  When studying the behavior or migration of mid-size 
companies, they do not appear to exhibit unusual behavior relative to companies with 
smaller market capitalizations, especially in the area of mergers and acquisitions.  Thus, 
the question becomes why small-cap companies underperform relative to their risk 
level.  The answer lies in the inclusion of the NASDAQ stocks to the CRSP database after 
1972.  This change not only doubled the number of stocks deemed small-caps, but also 
added a significant number of unprofitable fast-growing companies to the small-cap 
growth category, specifically in the technology and healthcare industries.  The study 
benefits practitioners by providing insight into the omnipresent claim of mid-cap 
outperformance from 1980-2014, while also benefiting academia providing more insight 
into small-caps’ underperformance during this period and how investigating small-cap 
growth companies further could add insight into the viability or magnitude of the size 
and value premium going forward. 
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I INTRODUCTION 
Stock investing has changed substantially over the past 100 years.  Today, most 
asset allocators’ stock portfolios are diversified among securities with large- and small-
market capitalizations.  This study investigates stocks residing in the middle-market 
capitalizations (otherwise known as mid-cap stocks).  Currently, over 1,300 funds focus 
on these securities; almost as many small-capitalization funds.  To understand how this 
asset class came to fruition, one needs to understand the history of finance and stock 
investing. 
The foundation of academic research in finance began with Harry Markowitz 
(1952) in his groundbreaking paper Portfolio Selection; the basis for the now well-
known theory among academics and practitioners called Modern Portfolio Theory 
(MPT).  This theory revealed investors have different risk profiles.  Some prefer less risk, 
some prefer more risk, and by choosing an optimum mix of risk assets and allocating 
between investment options, investors could maximize the return of a portfolio at their 
given level of risk.  In other words, it showed, via diversification, how an investor’s 
wealth could be optimally invested in financial assets to produce an optimal return 
while also eliminating some (not all) of the intrinsic or company-specific risk of a single 
asset.   
From a practitioner standpoint, this placed rigor around the widely known 
assumption at the time that “all your eggs should not be placed in the same basket.”  
Moreover, before Markowitz, investment courses taught in universities were mainly 
focused on single security analysis; which meant picking undervalued stocks.  Benjamin 
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Graham and David Dodd advocated what is called value investing, which centered on 
purchasing a security or company stock of a profitable company with undervalued 
assets.  A factor identified in the  Basu (1977)  paper which he called the value premium 
and was formalized later in Fama and French’s three-factor model (Fama and French 
1992). 
The issue with Markowitz’s model was it defined volatility and risk the same, 
which led to its offshoot; the asset pricing models developed by Sharpe (1964) and 
Litner (1965) in the 1960s, otherwise known as the Capital Asset Pricing Model (CAPM).  
The model was a significant advancement to Modern Portfolio Theory, evidenced by the 
fact both Markowitz and Sharpe shared the Nobel Prize in 1990.  CAPM formally 
established the relationship between risk and reward and has formed the way 
researchers and practitioners think about returns and risk.  It was premised on the fact 
investors would pressure on the price of a stock to the point where the expected return 
would compensate them for the risk.  Thus, the riskier, more volatile stocks compared 
to the market would require lower prices to achieve a higher return.  Moreover, the risk 
of the stock was measured relative to the market as opposed to its own price volatility.  
The stock price would be set by the market, and investors would achieve returns directly 
related to risk as measured by the market beta. The beta (or relative risk of a specific 
stock share) reflects its marginal contribution to the risk of the entire market portfolio 
of risky securities.  In the end, CAPM provided a simple linear relationship between 
market risk and expected return and is widely considered the foundation of modern 
price theory for capital markets. 
3 
Despite all the accolades, the CAPM model did not adequately explain the 
observed returns of securities, especially the ones that were much more volatile than 
the market.  The model came into question when Fama and MacBeth (1973) 
determined, as predicted by Sharpe’s model, there is a positive relation between 
average stock returns and risk; however, the results were period-specific.  In other 
words, prices and actual performance may not fall in line with what the CAPM model 
should have predicted during certain periods.  Additionally, investment managers (the 
practitioners) with a focus on small or value companies were claiming they were skilled 
in outperforming the market – a claim that did not seem to coincide with what was 
being discovered in academia. 
This spawned new challenges to the old model.  Ross (1976) first challenges 
CAPM model with the Arbitrage Pricing Theory; a theory that espouses a multi-factor 
explanation, as opposed to a single factor in CAPM, whereby there are multiple risk 
premia to compensate investors for return. This led to notion that “beta is dead” and 
more follow-up research and theories in the 1970s and 1980s showing there may be 
additional risk premia that the CAPM model does not capture, according to Ball (1978), 
Basu (1977) and Reinganum (1981). 
This research study zeros in on one of the most popular challenges to the CAPM 
theory; the idea of earning a premium by investing in smaller capitalization companies – 
a concept that has been around since the early 1980s and first was discussed in Rolf 
Banz’s seminal paper in 1981.  This was an earth-shattering proposition at the time, 
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since Banz found firms with the smaller market capitalization had higher returns, but 
not necessarily higher betas. 
The size effect, as it was termed, became an important concern for retail and 
institutional money managers as well.  In fact, it led to the development of an entirely 
new asset class for institutions and mutual funds, which changed stock investing as we 
know it.  However, for the next 20 years after the Banz discovery, capturing the 
premium became the biggest challenge for academics as well as practitioners and it 
came under intense scrutiny.  The small-cap stock asset class underperformed large- and 
mid-cap stocks from 1980 to 2000.  The speculation was that once the secret was 
discovered by Banz , the small-cap premium disappeared.  In addition to the long 
periods of poor performance, the small-cap effect weaknesses were revealed in follow-
up studies that found the return was concentrated in less-liquid stocks or microcap 
stocks, with most of the premium occurring in the January.   
The size effect is one of the most prominent academic anomalies.  The history of 
research around small-capitalization securities and their role in discrediting CAPM is 
rich.  This study reevaluates the small-firm effect in a different light.  The question 
revolves around how stock market asset classes are defined which, in the academic 
context, classifies a stock in only two ways; large or small.  The size of the equity value 
may be able explain returns of the stock, but the classification used in academia appears 
too broad and neglects to consider the companies in between large and small market 
capitalizations (i.e., mid-caps).  Why do academics slavishly use this simple bifurcation 
method to easily divide the large and small company stocks and not disaggregate the 
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mid-size firms?  Moreover, how do you define a small-cap?  Academic studies have 
devised various definitions of small-caps, the bottom 10% of the NYSE, securities listed 
on the AMEX , or stocks listed on the NASDAQ. However, at least in academia, no one 
has analyzed the middle-market capitalization companies in any capacity. In fact, 
Fama/French’s famous three-factor study, simply set the breaking point for the small-
cap factor (SMB) at the median capitalization of the NYSE market.   
Despite this, practitioners (i.e., money managers) have established and invested 
in mid-cap funds since the early 1990s when Russell released the first mid-cap index.  
Moreover, this is when the Morningstar, a highly respected source of independent 
investment analysis for beginners and sophisticated investors, created the now 
ubiquitous nine-square grid (style boxes) that capture size, security valuation, and 
security growth.  One well-known mid-cap money manager I spoke with said, “The 
institutional world didn’t really recognize mid-caps as a class until after Russell launched 
their index…. Morningstar invented the style boxes, and that definitely gave impetus to 
the category.  Morningstar was an early fan of … our Mid-Cap Growth Fund” 
(Anonymous personal communication, May 22, 2015).  
 Currently, according to Morningstar, there are over 1,300 mutual funds 
classified as mid-cap funds as of 2014. What’s more, the widely regarded Russell mid-
cap index has outperformed the large (Russell 1000) and small-cap indices (Russell 2000) 
over the past 34 years with less risk than small-caps (s.d. = 16.8% versus 19.5%) and only 
slightly more than large-caps (s.d. = 15.3%).  
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 This fact has been behind the marketing effort of most mid-cap mutual fund 
managers.   One manager leads off a white paper with this comment, “However, we 
believe mid-cap stocks are an anomaly. Over a reasonably long-period of time, mid-caps 
have outperformed both large-caps and small-caps, with less relative risk as measured 
by historical index volatility,” (Lazorishak 2014).  There are various arguments managers 
use as to why they invest in mid-caps.  Another leading mid-cap asset manager claims 
mid-cap stocks are an “investment sweet spot” and states several reasons why: “better 
diversification of business operations, deeper manager resources, less volatility and 
more moderate downside risk, more operational experience, more apt to benefit from 
new product growth, more nimble, and better margin performance than small 
companies with faster earnings growth.” (Arends 2014) 
 This study will probe into the “myth” around investing in mid-caps, called a 
myth since there is no academic research to support isolating this asset class to use in a 
diversified portfolio.  The research aims to provide the practitioner with a study that 
delves deeper into this phenomenon, which I am calling the “mid-cap effect,” by 
evaluating their role in the domestic stock markets over the past 85 years.  At the same 
time, it will analyze the style characteristics (value and growth) while also studying: the 
behavior of mid-cap stocks by assessing migration, how and what type of small- and 
large-caps becomes mid-caps, how a mid-cap becomes a large-cap, and the effect on 
performance when mid-cap drops to a small-cap.  Moreover, it will advance and fill the 
gap in academic research around small-caps by answering the research question 
centered on whether the mid-cap category is unique in having superior risk-return 
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tradeoff compared to large and small companies.  Could there be something unique 
about this asset class that academia and practitioners are missing?  Could the mid-cap 
asset class exhibit more merger and acquisition activity than small-caps?  Could one 
industry be the reason for mid-caps outperformance?  This study will provide a better 
sense of how and what type of mid-cap stocks merge, go bankrupt, or migrate to a 
large-cap stock. 
The entire foundation of academic research in investing tends to be based on 
asset pricing models developed by Sharpe, Litner and Black in the 1960s (i.e., CAPM).  
This research study expects to contribute to the academic literature around the 
misspecification of the CAPM model by delving deeper into one of the most popular 
anomalies: the small-firm effect.  The study will dissect the asset class by studying the 
mid-size companies using analyses on the mid-size firm effect and the style-return 
characteristics of the asset class.  This will benefit the practitioner by establishing 
academic rigor around mid-cap investing and validating (or not validating) an allocation 
to this popular asset class.  
  
8 
II LITERATURE REVIEW 
I.1 Small-Firm Effect 
The research on the companies with smaller market capitalizations is vast.  Rolf 
Banz and Marc Reinganum are the most common names associated with this important 
discovery.  Rolf Banz’s (1981) study 35 years ago made him the unofficial father of the 
small-firm effect.  He led the way on studying these type of companies, firms with 
smaller market capitalizations, in his seminal paper called The Relationship between 
Return and Market Value of Common Stocks. He studies what he terms the “size effect” 
where he found firms with smaller market capitalizations have higher risk-adjusted 
returns than larger firms.  The paper focused on firms on the New York Stock Exchange 
(NYSE) from 1936 to 1975 and formed five equally-weighted and value-weighted 
portfolios with a stipulation the firms had to be public for at least five years.  
At the same time, Marc Reinganum also was studying performance of small 
firms. Reinganum (1980) uses Arbitrage Pricing Theory to measure risk and assessed 
small-capitalization stocks by researching all securities on the NYSE and the American 
Stock Exchange (AMEX) from 1963-1978.  He found that grouping portfolios by firm size 
(small and large), the small-company portfolio earned, on average, 20% more than the 
large company portfolios.  Moreover, Reinganum (1981) extended this study by using 
CAPM as his measure of risk to evaluate small-caps.  He formed 10 equal-weighted 
portfolios, the first decile as the largest while the tenth decile contained stocks with the 
smallest market cap, based on market size, and analyzed their excess return relative to 
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the market.  He found only positive anomalous return behavior in the bottom two 
deciles (or portfolios) with the smallest market capitalization.   
As noted in the table below, in years following, others conducted research on 
the small-firm effect using various definitions with varying results.  Brown et al (1983b) 
studied the entire NYSE from 1962-1978, Keim (1983) studied the NYSE and AMEX from 
1963-1979, Lamoureux and Sanger (1989) looked at only NASDAQ stocks in addition to 
the NYSE and AMEX from 1973-1985, and Fama-French (1992) studied the entire CRSP 
database NYSE/AMEX/NASDAQ from 1962 to 1986, then extended the study with Jim 
Davis to 1929 to 1997. The results show the monthly size premium ranging from 0.2% 
(Fama, French and Davis) to 2.52% (Keim). 
Table 1 Results of Previous Studies on the Small-cap Effect 
 
Source: Van Dijk (2011) 
Fama-French (1992) was one of the most significant of these studies and is said 
to be the paper that awakened academics and practitioners to this asset classification.  
They find that beta in isolation does little to explain variation in returns.  They suggest 
stock risks are multi-dimensional and postulate that the market, size, and book-to-
Paper Size premium (% 
p.m.)
Test 
period
# Securities #
Portfolios
MV largest/ 
smallest
Banz (1981) 0.40 1936–1975 NYSE 5 NA
Reinganum (1981) 1.77 1963–1977 566 NYSE- AMEX 10 212
Brown et al. (1983b) 1.85 1962–1978 566 NYSE 6 NA
Keim (1983) 2.52 1963–1979 1500–2400 NYSE - 
AMEX
10 248
Lamoureux and Sanger (1989) 2.00 1973–1985 7659 Nasdaq 20 449
Lamoureux and Sanger (1989) 1.70 1973–1985 4170 NYSE/Amex 20 1519
Fama and French (1992) 0.63 1962–1989 NYSE/Amex/Nasdaq 10 (SMB = Median ) 296
Fama, French, Davis (2000) 0.2 (t-stat 1.78) 1929-1997 NYSE/Amex/Nasdaq 10 (SMB = Median) 296
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market equity (BE/ME) capture the cross-section of average returns during the period 
1963 to 1990.  They believe the differences in average return are due to differences in 
risk and these two factors are proxies for sensitivity to risk factors.  However, when 
studying size alone during the various sub-periods the size premium did not appear 
persistent.  Fama and French (1995) show that small stocks tend to be less profitable 
than big stocks.  However, prior to 1980, this was not so.  For some unexplained reason, 
the recession of 1981 and 1982 was a “prolonged-earnings depression” for small stocks 
and they do not participate in market boom in the middle and late 1990s.  
II.1.1 Persistence of the Small-Firm Effect 
The small-firm effect has been inconsistent and there have been several papers 
showing where the small-firm effect disappeared during prolonged periods.  Banz (1981) 
and Keim (1983) show the size effect is inconsistent over the 1926-1975 period.  Some 
have even questioned the well-known Reinganum (1981) study by arguing there is a 
selection bias since it only focuses on the 14-year period 1963-1977.  Marsh et al (1983) 
looked at quarterly stock market data from June 1967 to December 1979 to evaluate 
the size effect.  He rejected the notion the small-cap premium is stable over time and 
found that different estimation measures could produce different conclusions about the 
size effect. Brown et al (1983) showed the magnitude of the size effect is sensitive to 
time periods.  Chan, Karceski and Lakonishok (2000), Van Dijk (2011), Crain (2011), 
Eleswarapu and Reinganum (1993), Dichev (1998), showed the small-cap premium was 
negative during the 1980s and 1990s.  Handa et al (1989) showed the small-firm effect 
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varied over different sub-periods between 1941 and 1982.  Pettengil et al (2002) 
showed small-cap outperformance can vary over bull and bear markets. 
 Fama, French and Davis (2000) extended the Fama-French 1992 study to a 68-
year period and found similar results to the earlier one; however, the size premium 
using their definition over the entire period (1929-1997) was shown to not be 
significant. Horowitz, Loughran, Savin (2000a & 2000b) warned money managers not to 
bet on the size effect because it changes over time.  They delved into the size effect 
using the Fama and French (1992) method and found the small-firm premium to be 
statistically insignificant in explaining returns.  As noted in the charts below (Figure 1), 
Crain (2011) used the Horowitz et al (2000) studies to show small-cap firms had more 
years of underperformance (17 years) than premium years (12).  
12 
 
Figure 1 Annual Returns of the Smallest Decile minus Largest Decile 
Source: Crain (2011) 
Amihud (2002) shows the size effect is strong from 1964 to 1980, but from 1981-
1997, it is statistically insignificant.  Dimson (2011) shows the size premium does exist 
over long periods of time, but their behavior has changed and no longer outperforms.  
Roll (1983) looked at mean returns of the American Stock Exchange stocks 
(basically a measure small-cap) and the NYSE (large-cap) stocks from 1963 -1981 using a 
buy-hold approach, arithmetic method, and daily rebalancing.  He found a significance 
difference in the returns of small-cap stocks over large-cap stocks using all approaches; 
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however, the rebalanced and arithmetic methods proved superior to the buy-and-hold 
strategy. 
II.1.2 January or Seasonality Effect 
The January effect is sometimes called the seasonality effect or Turn-of-the-Year 
effect.  There has been considerable research around the puzzling January effect lead by 
the Rozeff and Kinney’s (1976) seminal study, which showed stocks generally increase in 
the month of January (believed to be due to tax-loss harvesting in December), and these 
returns tend be higher than any other month.  As noted in the graph below (Figure 2), 
this seasonality effect tends be more pronounced with small-caps (mainly in the first 
week of the month); when removing the month of January, it causes the small-cap 
premium to disappear (Reinganum (1981), Roll (1981) and Keim (1983).  Keim (1982) 
looked at daily and monthly returns from 1963-1979 to investigate seasonality of the 
small-firm effect.  He found that 50% of the small-firm effect occurred in January of 
every year with 26% attributable in the first week of trading.  Horowitz et al (2000a), 
Easterday et al (2009), Lamoureux and Sanger (1989) observe that the smallest decile 
returns are much higher than the larger deciles during the month of January, while 
Brown et al (1983) show the January effect for small firms did exist between 1967 and 
1979.   
Gu (2003),  Stephan (2009), Crain (2011) and Van Dijk (2011) show the January 
effect is still present, but has decreased over time, while Easterday et al (2009) and 
Moller and Zinca (2008) study just the sub-period 1980-2007 and found the January 
effect also existed during this time period and was more prevalent with small-caps. 
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Figure 2 The January Effect 
Source: Van Dijk (2011); Seasonal patterns in the size effect in U.S. equity returns 1927–
2010. This figure depicts the average market-weighted return differential between the 
smallest and largest size-quintiles of all NYSE, Amex, and Nasdaq stocks in each month 
over the period 1927–2010. 
However, there is not a clear explanation as to why the January effect exists.  
Constantinides (1984) shows that tax trading does not explain the small-firm anomaly, 
but may be a factor in the seasonal (January) effect.  Sias and Starks (1997) studied 
securities held mostly by individuals as opposed to institutions and concluded these 
securities had a much stronger seasonality effect, while Poterba and Weisbenner (2001) 
found changes in the capital gains tax has an effect on the January anomaly. This implies 
the effect may be caused by tax-loss selling by individuals in December and buying back 
in January – a theory also supported by Keim (1983).  Roll (1983) contested this 
reasoning that the investors could “bid up” the prices in December to take advantage of 
the January increase.  His counter to this logic is the fact it becomes more challenging 
with small-caps because of the lack of liquidity and transaction costs.  Moreover, 
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internationally, Dimson et al (2002) and Brown et al (1983) did not find any seasonality 
effect with U.K. stocks and Australia, respectively;  while Japanese and Canadian (pre-
cap gains tax) stock markets showed signs of the January effect even when there was no 
reason for tax-loss selling, per Berges et al (1984) and Kato and Schallheim (1985). 
II.1.3 Limited to the Smallest Firms in the Bottom Decile 
Banz (1981) states the relationship between small-company stocks is not linear 
and only occurs with the very smallest firms; thus, the “larger” small-caps and mid-caps 
do not reveal a size premium.  He says the smallest firms have very unexplained mean 
returns.  However, in regards to mid-cap, he does show an equivalent metric using 
median-sized firms.  It is important to note his analysis is very limited on median-sized 
firms, especially given he only uses the NYSE.  Additionally, any analysis around the 
median market cap uses a small sample size and limited time frame.  Moreover, 
Reinganum (1981) found the effect only occurred in the bottom two deciles (or 
portfolios) with the smallest market capitalization.  Horowitz et al (2000a) show the size 
effect is driven by smaller listed firms with market capitalizations less than $5 million, 
while Fama-French (2008) says the size effect “owes much of its power to microcaps.”  
Crain (2011) and Bryan (2014) show the small-cap premium is driven mainly by the 
smallest 5% of firms.  However, none of these studies provide a strong explanation.  
Crain (2011) speculates the lower liquidity in these smaller stocks could provide a 
liquidity premium. 
II.1.4 Compensation for Risk 
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Since Banz’s seminal research on size effect, there have been many research 
papers challenging its existence.  The empirical research has mostly questioned whether 
there is a true risk-based story to explain the size effect (some sort of “extra” risk the 
borne by the investor); or could the explanation be centered on investment decisions by 
firms, stock-market liquidity, or investor behavior.  
Stoll (1983) looks at transactions costs (bid-ask spread and broker commissions) 
and the contention the small-cap premium can achieved before transactions costs; thus, 
discrediting CAPM.  He finds this is dependent on investment horizon.  In situations 
where the horizon is under one year, the small-cap premium disappears when you 
consider transaction costs.  He also showed the small-cap bias is not caused by 
infrequent trading when using monthly data.  Several studies have expanded on this by 
investigating whether or not the small-cap premiums may be compensation for liquidity 
risk.  Amihud and Mendelson (1986) show there is a relationship between return and 
stock illiquidity as measured by bid-ask spreads.  Brennan and Subrahmanyan (1996),  
Amihud (2002), Hou and Moskowitz (2005), Sadka (2006), Liu (2006), and Ibbotson, 
Chen, Kim, and Hu (2013) continue on the Amihud et al (1986) study by showing the 
illiquidity effect measured in various ways (turnover, bid-ask spread, commissions) is  
much stronger in relation to small-caps, which helps explain why there are excess 
returns with smaller-sized companies.  Thus, the smaller firms generate higher returns 
due to the liquidity risk.  Zhang (2006) says “information uncertainty” is a risk factor and 
relates the size premium to the lack of information the investors have on the small 
firms. He also finds a higher return is achieved for illiquid stocks. Most recently, Kalesnik 
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and Beck (2015), as noted in Table 2, shows smaller stocks do indeed have wider bid-ask 
spreads, but this has decreased over the past 10 years. 
Table 2 Bid-Ask Spreads by Size Groups (U.S., 1988-2014) 
 
 
Chen (1983) uses APT to show there is a relationship between the size-effect and 
risk, while Chan & Chen (1985) used a multi-factor pricing equation to show changing 
risk premiums (as measured by default spreads and other economic variables)  due to 
economic contractions and expansions explained the additional return provided by 
small-cap stocks versus large-cap. This gives more weight to the efficient market story, 
which explains the size effect as an additional risk borne by the investor as opposed to 
some sort of behavioral story based on investor preferences. 
Roll (1981) delves deeper into the risk story, whereby the small-cap investor is 
taking on more risk relative to a large-cap so therefore is paid a higher return. He finds, 
because they trade less frequently, the actual small-cap risk is downward-biased and 
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underestimated regardless of which model you use. This was substantiated by Dimson 
(1979) and Scholes and Williams (1977).  However, Reinganum (1982) tests this 
hypothesis that small firms have higher average returns due to improper estimations of 
security betas.  The results showed while the direction of the bias in security betas is 
apparent, the magnitude of the difference in returns is not explained by the slight 
difference in beta.  Levy (1978) and Mayshar (1979) state transaction costs and other 
constraints limit the average investor’s ability to diversify properly, which would negate 
any predictions by CAPM since it assumes all investors are diversified. In other words, 
the investor bears additional risk that requires additional compensation.  Lakonishok 
and Shapiro (1984, 1985) study CRSP data from 1954-1981 and reject this implication, 
but also reject the notion CAPM can explain the small-firm effect.  Berk (1995) 
challenges the assumption that the size anomaly implies that the CAPM is misspecified 
and says it is misleading to refer to the size effect as an anomaly.  He states that market 
value may not be the proxy for the missing factor in CAPM. Berk (1996) and Berk (1997) 
show there is no relation between size and market value using other measures for firm 
size (like sales).  When this occurs, firms with small market values will have higher 
expected returns because the size anomaly reflects the higher discount rates (due to the 
higher risk) associated with the these smaller companies.  This was also reiterated in 
Kalesnik and Beck (2015), see Table 3, which showed the difference in credit ratings 
between the smallest and largest deciles. 
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Table 3 Distressed and Volatility Characteristics of Stocks by Size Groups (U.S., 1988-
2014) 
 
II.1.5 International Markets 
There have been several studies examining the size effect in other countries. Van 
Dijk ( 2013)  lists research on 19 countries and found in 18 of the 19 emerging market 
and developed countries the small-firm effect existed with the premium ranging from 
0.13% to 5.06%. However, he caveats this by saying some of the research may not be 
reliable; the time periods varied, some of the studies were not published in reputable 
journals, and there is no clear consensus on whether the size of the firm should be 
based on local stocks or a broader index like all of Europe or Asia.  Various research 
studies, including Annaert et al (2002), Rouwenhorst (1999), and Barry et al (2001), 
delve into this and find dramatic differences when comparing an emerging market, for 
instance, to its own country or the broader emerging-market index.    Dimson and Marsh 
(1999) and Michou et al (2010) find similar results to the U.S. studies.  There was a size 
premium in the U.K. form 1955 to 1986, but from 1989 to 1997 large stocks 
outperformed by the same amount.  The same is true for Australia where Brown, 
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Kleidon and Marsh (1983), Beedles, Dodd and Officer (1988), Anderson, Lynch and 
Mathiou (1990), and Gaunt, Gray and McIvor (2000) all document a size effect. 
II.1.6 Other Explanations of the Small-Firm Effect 
There are several arguments to explain why the small-firm effect occurs; 
estimation errors, disinformation, existence of tax deferrals, growth potential.   
Keown and Fields (1988) relate the small-firm effect to the merger effect, which 
provided further evidence that the anomaly presented in Wansley, Roenfeldt and 
Cooley (1983) was not due to likely acquisition targets, but based on the smaller market 
capitalization. 
Cook and Rozeff (1984) studied Basu and Reinganum’s contradictory convictions 
on the role of the value effect as measure by the earnings/price ration on the small-cap 
effect.  Reinganum believed size subsumes the earnings/price ratio and Basu believed 
just the opposite.  Cook et al (1984) found that neither are correct and that they are two 
separate effects. 
Schwert ( 1983)  states that, the statistical association between risk and average 
returns is only “marginally significant” and “firm size and average stock returns is about 
as strong as the association between risk and average returns.” 
Chan and Chen (1991) postulate that the small firms tend to be marginal firms 
that have lost value due to poor performance and are more likely to have high leverage. 
Thus, they are more sensitive to the economy and will have higher returns than the 
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large firms when the economic news is positive and the macroeconomic environment 
improves. 
Investor behavior studies have shown that there may be some investor 
preference for small-cap stocks. Gompers and Metrick (2001) show that increased 
institutional demand for stocks drives a preference for large liquid stocks over smaller 
ones, while Lakonishok et al (1992) argues that smaller-company stocks are harder to 
justify to plan sponsors.   
Although Israel and Moskowitz (2013) could not provide statistically significant 
evidence, they attribute the change in the small-cap premium over time to the increase 
in institutional and hedge-fund participation.  Chordia, Subrahmanyam and Tong (2014) 
show increased liquidity and trading due to hedge-fund assets under management led 
to a decline in the premiums associated with several anomalies including the small-firm 
effect.  Crain (2011) says the findings also may be linked to growth of small-cap mutual 
and investment funds in the 1980s.  
It is also interesting to note the recent findings of Asness et al (2015). They find 
that stocks with very poor quality are typically small and distressed/illiquid with much 
lower returns, which drag down the over return of the small-cap asset class.  Thus, they 
reexamine the small-cap premium after to controlling for quality by using what he calls a 
QMJ or Quality minus Junk factor (long the top 30% high-quality and short the bottom 
30% junk stocks), which ranks stocks on profitability (profits per unit of book value), 
growth (five-year growth in profitability), safety (low-volatility and leverage), and 
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payout ratio.  Once they control for “junk” stocks, the results “produce a robust size 
premium that is present in all time periods, with no reliably detectable differences 
across time from July 1957 to December 2012, in all months of the year, across all 
industries, across nearly two dozen international equity markets, and across five 
different measures of size not based on market prices.”  This is related to a similar study 
by Hou and Van Dijk (2014), which finds small firms’ underperformance in the 1980s and 
90s was due to “negative profitability shocks.” 
Barry and Brown (1984) look at NYSE returns from 1931-1980 to investigate the 
information hypothesis in relation to the small-firm effect; they state the “ risk of low-
information securities is higher than the perceived risk of high information securities.”  
They also investigate the period-listing effect, which says returns for securities listed for 
a shorter time are higher than securities listed longer. 
Finally, Mcquarrie (2009) argues the CRSP database, the most widely utilized 
stock database by academics and practitioners (via Morningstar/Ibbotson), has some 
key limitations.  First, CRSP only goes back to 1926, so it excludes a large portion of 
history in the stock market going back to the 1790s.  Second, and more importantly, the 
CRSP only uses the NYSE before 1962, which means all the stocks trading on the OTC on 
exchanges in Boston, Chicago, Philadelphia, etc., were excluded.  These excluded stocks 
would most definitely be classified as the smaller enterprises in the bottom-
capitalization deciles.  Thus, it leads one to question whether the data on small-cap 
stocks is a good representation.  This is especially true since the small-cap universe, as 
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defined by the NYSE in the 1930s, consisted mainly of large-cap stocks that became 
what Fama and French (2006) termed “fallen angels.” 
II.2 MIGRATION 
Fama and French (2007) examine the behavior of small and large stocks and how 
they migrate across size and value portfolios to contribute to the size and value 
premium.  As noted in their paper, they classify stock migration according to four 
cohorts: 1) Same- stocks that do not change category from one period to the next; 2) 
dSize- small stocks that transition to large stocks and large stocks that transition to small 
stocks; 3) Plus- stocks that move to neutral or growth or are acquired; 4) Minus- stocks 
that move toward value, delisted, or their book equity goes negative.  In regards to the 
size premium, they find the majority of the size premium from 1927 to 2006 is linked to 
the high average excess returns (more than 50%) earned by the 8-12% of small-cap 
stocks that move from the small to large portfolio from year to year.  Moreover, even 
though “Plus” migrations are more likely to occur with value stocks, small-cap growth 
stocks, which also tend to be more profitable and fast growing, have the biggest impact 
on the small-cap premium when they move to large-cap given the size of their market 
cap versus value stocks.  On average, from 1926-2005,  8% of large-cap value stocks 
transitioned to small-caps, 6.3% of large neutral stocks, and 6.5% of large-growth stocks, 
while 6.3% of small-growth, 4.7% of small-neutral, and 2.8% of small value become 
large-caps on average every year.  Thus, a large-cap is more likely to migrate across 
boundaries compared to a small-cap.  Fama and French do admit this may have 
something to do with the using the NYSE median as the demarcation point, which 
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makes it more difficult for a very-small-cap company to transition up (due to its smaller 
capitalization) compared to a large-cap transitioning down. 
Gharghori et al (2007) study migration in Australian Securities Exchange (ASX) 
from 1991-2006 and find contradicting results.  They discover, in contrast to the Fama 
and French (2007) U.S. study, the size premium in the Aussie stock market is mainly due 
to the outsized return of small-cap value stocks that remain in the same group; thus, the 
small-cap stocks that change categories by growing to large-cap stock only make a 
minimal contribution to the size premium. 
Finally, Chen et al (2010) look at style migration in the U.S. market from June 
1975 to 2007 via five size quintiles (1 = smallest and 5 = largest) and show that, on 
average, over the time period the 84-88% of the stocks remain in the smallest and 
largest quintiles, while the middle quintiles tend to migrate the most with only 
approximately 65% of the stocks in the 2 and 3 quintiles staying in their same size 
category year to year.  
II.3 Value Premium 
Value-oriented stock selection has been occurring since the great Benjamin 
Graham started investing in the 1920s.  He and David Dodd espoused a philosophy of 
buying highly profitable, but undervalued securities.  Their primary criteria was noted in 
the book, “The Intelligent Investor,” which, along with some profitability metrics, the 
price of the stock could be no more than 1.5 times net asset value or 15 times the 
average of the three years’ earnings Graham (1949).  
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This posed another challenge to the CAPM model and eventually led to academic 
research analyzing how a portfolio strategy of stocks with strong value characteristics 
(defined in various ways) has outperformed growth stocks and the market overall. Basu 
(1977) led the way with his seminal paper, “Investment Performance of Common Stocks 
in Relation to their Price-Earnings Ratios.”  In this paper, Basu defines a value stock as 
low P/E (price to earnings) and forms five equally weighted portfolios from low to high 
P/Es using a 14-year sample from 1957 to 1971. As noted in the table below, Table 4, he 
finds the low P/E portfolio outperformed the high P/E one by approximately six percent, 
16.3% versus 9.34%. Rosenberg, Reid, and Lanstein (1985) study the performance of 
high and low B/M stocks from 1973 to 1984 by going long the high and short the low 
B/M stocks.  They were one of the first to use B/M as the value metric and find the 
average monthly return of this portfolio was close to 0.36% per month during the time 
studied.  Fama and French (1990) study value and size characteristics.  They find that 
using a B/M metric, as B/M increases average returns increase and this effect is stronger 
with the smaller-market capitalization stocks.  They study the entire CRSP and 
COMPUSTAT databases from 1963-1990 and determine the highest B/M deciles 
produced a 1% average-monthly-return premium over the lowest B/M decile.  They also 
found a stronger effect in the smaller stocks, which were 1% higher than large stocks. 
Table 4 Basu (1977) Results 
Source: Basu (1977) 
26 
 
 
Jaffe, Jeffrey F., Donald B. Keim, and Randolph Westerfield (1989) study 30 NYSE 
and AMEX firm portfolios ranked first by E/P and then size from April 1951 to December 
1986.  They found positive and significant returns among the highest E/P portfolios 
regardless of size. 
Basu (1993) uses earnings yield as a valuation metric (earnings to price or E/P).  
He creates five equally weighted portfolios from high to low and concludes the returns 
are highest for high-earnings-yielding stock and even higher in the small-cap asset class.   
Lakonishok, Sleifer and Vishny (1994) research several value metrics: book-to-
market (B/M), cash flow to price (C/P), earnings to price (E/P), growth of sales (GS), and 
multidimensional measures of value from 1963-1990 of stocks on the NYSE/AMEX.  They 
found the high-low C/P portfolio produced the highest return (11% difference) for a 
single variable and a strategy of using C/P and GS together outperform all portfolios 
with a 22% per-year-return.  They also suggest that cognitive behavioral biases were the 
driver of the rewards driven by the value premium.  
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Fama and French (1993) investigate all stocks excluding financials on the NYSE, 
AMEX, and NASDAQ exchanges from 1963 to 1990 using the earnings to price and 
dividend to price (D/P) rations in addition to book-to-market.  They build six market-
value-weighted portfolios based on size and value: small value, small neutral, small 
growth, big value, big neutral and big growth.  The size break-point is at the median 
market value of the New York Stock Exchange and the B/M groups are ranked with the 
top 30% deemed “high” (or value), the next 40% “neutral,” and the next 30% “low” (or 
growth).  They develop a high-minus-low (HML) factor, which equates ½ (small value + 
big value) minus ½ (small growth + big growth).  The small-minus-big factor measures 
the small-cap effect (SMB) and is noted as: SMB = 1/3 (small value + small neutral + 
small growth) – 1/3 (big value + big neutral + big growth).  Again, they find higher 
returns on small and value stocks and the highest in the small-cap value portfolios.  
Moreover, they find the E/P and D/P high minus low portfolios produce a monthly 
return premium of 0.12 -0.14%.  They continue on this in their Fama and French (1996) 
paper by combing two-value characterics using the B/M and GS (five-year growth in 
sales), E/P and GS, and CP and GS.  They verify that there are high average returns on 
portfolios using all the different value measures. 
Chan, Jegadeesh, Lakonishok, J. (1995) study the largest 20% CRSP NYSE-AMEX 
value and glamour (growth) stocks from 1968 to 1991 using high and low book-to-
market ratios.  They discover a 5% average five-year return (5 post-formation years) 
difference between high and low book-to-market portfolios. As noted in Table 5, Chan 
and Lakonishok (2004) look at various studies and determine value-investing produces 
28 
higher returns, but believe the behavioral argument (as opposed to higher risk) explains 
this difference.   
Chan, Hamao and Lakonishok (1991) study the value premium in the Japanese 
stock market using several metrics: earnings yield, book-to-market and cash-flow yield 
from 1971 to 1988.  They find a significant relationship between all of them; however, 
book-to-market and cash-flow-yield have the biggest impact on expected returns.  
Capaul, Rowley and Sharpe (1993) study the value premium across six countries (France, 
Germany, U.K., Switzerland and the U.S.) from January 1981 to January 1992 and found 
the value-growth spread to be significant and positive on a global basis (0.29%/month), 
but not significant at the country level.  This implies a value strategy needs to be 
implemented globally.   
Fama and French (1998) study value and growth stocks in 13 markets across the 
U.S., Europe, and Asia from 1975 to 1995 and found a value premium of 7.68% per year 
on a global basis and an individual country basis in 12 of the 13 markets. 
Kothari, Shanken and Sloan (1995) challenge the Fama and French (1992) study 
that used Compustat data by conducting the same analysis with the Standard and Poor’s 
industry-level data from 1947 to 1987.  They found that, due to survivorship-bias issues, 
the true relationship between high and low B/M and average returns were very weak.   
Similar to small-cap stocks, some believe the extra return earned by value stocks 
(i.e., the value premium) could potentially have a risk story and others believe it is more 
behavioral.  Obviously, Fama and French (1992, 1993) believe it is the compensation for 
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higher risk, while Lakonishok, Sleifer and Vishny (1994) espouse a behavioral 
explanation related to judgmental biases and agency issues with institutional money 
managers. 
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Table 5 Chan and Lakonishok (2004) Results 
Source: Chan and Lakonishok (2004) 
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III THEORECTICAL BACKGROUND AND HYPOTHESIS 
As noted in the literature review, in previous studies, the small-cap premium was 
described as not being persistent. In most of the studies, if the premium was statistically 
significant, the study utilized a narrow time period, which implies data snooping.   The 
longest history provided, Fama, French and Davis (2000), revealed a small-cap premium 
of 0.2% per month over a 68-year period; however, the data was found to not be 
significantly different from zero.  It is very possible the mid-cap premium is more stable 
through time and it is one of the goals of this study to develop the proper test to 
evaluate this premium.  The objective is to create a mid-cap premium measurement 
that evaluates a premium over small-caps and a premium over large-caps, which 
effectively is long mid-cap stocks and short large-cap stocks, while also going long mid-
caps and short small-caps.  Most analyses specifically focused on mid-caps are limited to 
white papers or reports developed by practitioners; not academics. Mainly large money 
managers of mid-cap funds with the goal of selling their product.  The most common 
index is maintained by Russell Investments, the Russell mid-cap index, so most of these 
white papers produced by practitioners utilize their comprehensive database, which 
provides the returns of this index going back to 1979.  Fortunately, for the marketers of 
mid-cap funds, mid-caps outperformed the large and small indices over the 35-year 
period 1979-2014.  My analysis will expand on this by creating an index using the same 
Russell mid-cap methodology; however, it will utilize data over an 85-year period via the 
CRSP database. The analysis also will provide a return for the large- and small-cap 
categories by determining the compound annual growth rate (CAGR) over the five, ten, 
32 
twenty, thirty, fifty and since-inception periods.  At the same time, from a practitioner 
perspective, shorter time frames are more relevant.  Thus, the analysis will evaluate 
each decade going back to the 1930s to not only provide a rolling 10-year and 5-year 
return, but also the percentage probability of achieving a premium in each of the size 
categories. From an academic perspective, the mid-cap premium will be evaluated in 
conjunction with a t-stat validity test.  The ultimate goal is to prove or disprove whether 
the outperformance of mid-caps over the past 35 years was or was not an anomaly.  
Hypothesis 1:  The mid-cap premium is more persistent through time.   
Hypothesis 1a:  The mid-cap premium is an anomaly of the 1980s and is 
statistically significant. 
Hypothesis 1b: The mid-cap premium is more likely to occur versus the small-
cap premium and large-company stocks. 
Since 1980, the Russell Mid-cap index has outperformed the Russell 2000 (Small-
cap index) with less return and risk.  This contradicts the research on small-caps by Banz 
and others.  Although we do not expect this to persist through time, some would expect 
mid-caps to have returns closer to small-caps, but with much less risk. One practitioner 
mentioned, “Ah, there was the hook: in theory, mid-cap was a sweet spot in the 
marketplace, with returns closer to small-caps and risk right in between small and 
large,” (Anonymous personal communication, May 22, 2015).  Thus, this research tests 
risk-adjust returns. 
Hypothesis 2:  Mid-cap companies have higher risk-adjusted returns over the 
past 85 years 
Fama and French examined how small-caps migrate to large-caps and how large-
caps migrate to mid-caps. They find on average, 8% of large-cap value stocks 
transitioned to small-caps, 6.3% of large-neutral stocks, and 6.5% of large-growth 
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stocks, while 6.3% of small-growth, 4.7% of small-neutral, and 2.8% of small-value 
become large-caps on average every year.  We examined this by studying how and what 
type of small stocks transition to mid-caps on their way to becoming large stocks.  Do 
certain stocks from specific industries make this journey?  Some practitioners believe 
the merger and acquisition activity occurs at higher rates in the mid-cap category 
relative to small-company stocks. 
Hypothesis 3:  Mid-cap companies have different positive and negative 
migrations than small-caps.  
Hypothesis 3a:  Mid-caps are more likely to be involved in mergers and 
acquisitions than small-caps. 
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IV DATA COLLECTION METHOD AND MEASURES 
The sample consists of all New York Stock Exchange (NYSE), the NYSE MKT 
(formerly known as the American Stock Exchange), NYSE ARCA (previously known as the 
Archipelago Exchange), the American Stock Exchange (AMEX), and NASDAQ ordinary 
common stocks that appear on the Center for Research in Securities Prices (CRSP) and 
on Compustat tapes with data available for certain income statement and balance sheet 
items. We exclude all CRSP share codes except 10 and 11; thus, there are no American 
depository receipts (ADRs), closed-end mutual funds, foreign stocks, unit investment 
trusts, and American trusts.  We do include REITS (CRSP share code 18) since they are 
part of the indices used by practitioners. 
The sample period is from January 1928 to December 2014.  The time periods for 
each market in the CRSP database are as follows: 
 
• New York Stock Exchange (NYSE) begins December 31, 1925 
• American Stock Exchange (NYSE MKT) begins July 2, 1962 
• NASDAQ Stock Market (NASDAQ) begins December 14, 1972 
• ARCA Exchange (ARCA) begins March 8, 2006 
 
There are various definitions of a large-caps, mid-caps, and small-caps.  The 
popular style-boxes developed by Morningstar defines a large-cap as a stock in the top 
70% of market capitalization, the next 20% are deemed mid-caps, and the bottom 10% 
are labeled small-caps.   Their portfolios are rebalanced quarterly.  While MSCI, takes 
the top 2,500 companies in the stock universe and calls the top 300 large-caps, the next 
450 mid-caps, and the next 1,750 small-caps.  The popular S&P indices are almost 
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impossible to replicate given they use a subjective committee approach to determine 
the constituents of their indices.  In general, they take the top 1500 stocks and the first 
500 (i.e., S&P 500) are considered large-caps, the next 400 (i.e., S&P 400) are mid-caps, 
and the next 600 are small-caps (i.e., S&P 600).  They add financial viability screens, 
which require the sum of the most recent four consecutive quarters’ as-reported 
earnings to be positive as should the most recent quarter, while firms’ balance-sheet 
leverage should be operationally justifiable.  This creates a quality tilt in all their indices. 
As noted in Table 6 below, the returns for all the index providers tend to be close 
to the proxy portfolios created (Russel Mid-Cap Proxy, CRSP Mid-Cap Proxy) so this 
study will form three value-weighted portfolios (Russell Small-Cap Proxy, Russell Mid-
Cap Proxy and Russell Large-Cap Proxy) using the Russell methodology.  Russell is one of 
the most popular benchmark providers for practitioners while also being the easiest to 
replicate.  We will use the Russell Mid-Cap Index (RMI) definition to evaluate mid-size 
stocks. The RMI is derived from the Russell 1000 (large-cap index), which is a sub-set of 
the Russell 3000 (total stock market index).  The first 1000 stocks are considered large- 
and mid-cap stocks, and the next 2000 are considered small-caps (i.e., the Russell 2000).   
Table 6 Proxy Return Comparison 
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As noted by Russell, to determine membership in Russell 3000 index, the 
following process occurs: 
• On the last trading day in May each year, all eligible securities are ranked by 
their total market capitalization. The largest 4,000 are determined; then the top 
3000 of the 4000 form the Russell 3000.  
• Reconstitution occurs on the last Friday in June. 
• All Russell indexes are completely rebuilt using annual reconstitution.  
• Eligible initial public offerings (IPOs) are added to Russell indexes at the end of 
each calendar quarter.  
• A stock must have a close price at or above $1.00 (on its primary exchange) on 
the last trading day in May to be considered eligible for inclusion. 
• Companies with a total market capitalization less than $30 million are not 
eligible for inclusion in Russell U.S. indexes. 
• Companies with only a small portion (5% or less) of their shares available in the 
marketplace are not eligible for the Russell Indexes; otherwise known as float 
adjusted.  
• The following share-types are not eligible for inclusion: preferred and convertible 
preferred stock, redeemable shares, participating preferred stock, warrants, 
rights, installment receipts and trust receipts. 
 
The Russell Mid-Cap Index is derived by excluding the first 200 securities of the 
Russell 1000 and including only the next 800 stocks.  However, in 1926, there were only 
about 700 companies in the entire market.  Thus, a percentage of market cap is more 
appropriate for this analysis.  According to Russell’s methodology, the large-cap 
category consists of the first 200 stocks of the Russell 3000, which equates to 
approximately 65% of the total market capitalization of the Russell 3000.  The Russell 
37 
Mid-Cap Index equates to the next 65% to 90%, and the residual, the small-cap index 
(Russell 2000), equates to the bottom 10%.  For simplicity and ease of programming, the 
Russell rules were not followed to the letter.  Thus, the proxy was reconstituted at the 
end of the year instead of June, and no restrictions on price and market cap were 
imposed in addition to ignoring the float adjustment.  As noted in Table 6, the Russell 
and CRSP proxy were compared to the actual indices and were found to be very close. 
Moreover, the objective of this study is to compare the mid-cap indices to the large and 
small asset classes using the same criteria so, as long as this was followed, the results 
would not change.  
A field was created to track cumulative market cap across the whole stock 
database and then value-weighted within the size the category. 
A second, more academic measurement focused on the CRSP 3-5 deciles was 
developed, which is a sub-set of the CRSP 10 decile index data popular in the 
Fama/French and other academic studies.  As with the Russell proxy, we used CRSP 
share codes 10, 11, and 18 (REITs).  Using the NYSE breakpoints provided by Ken French 
(French 2016), we divided all stocks in the CRSP database into 10 deciles; the 1st decile 
contains the top 10% of stocks in terms of cumulative market capitalization and the 
tenth (or bottom) decile contains the smallest 10%.  The CRSP 1st and 2nd deciles were 
grouped and deemed large-caps; the next 3rd, 4th and 5th deciles were grouped and 
deemed mid-caps, and the 6th through 10th deciles made up the small-caps.  From there, 
the stocks were ranked on market value and a value-weighted return was created for 
each asset class.  Based on end-of-year market values on December 31, we categorized 
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every stock on January 1st of the following year as a large (CRSP 1-2), mid (CRSP 3-5), or 
small (CRSP 6-10).  We then computed the yearly return for each security using the 
monthly return values provided by CRSP, and then weighted each security within its 
respective asset class, to compute a value-weighted return for each asset class each 
year.  Thus, if a company delisted mid-year, the return would still be represented in all 
the months it existed, which prevents survivorship bias.  The PERMNO was used as the 
unique identifier and market value was determined by multiplying the shares 
outstanding by the price. 
Like Fama-French (1992), a mid-cap premium variable – versus small (MMS) and 
versus large (MML) – was created.  Using the value (weighted portfolios for mid-caps 
and small-caps), the premium represents the difference in monthly returns between 
these two asset classes.  This is slightly different from the Fama-French (1992) 
calculation in which they dissect two asset classes (small and large) by computing a 
value-weighted return for the value, growth, and neutral classifications. They then take 
an equal-weighted average of the returns on the three small portfolios and three big 
portfolios and compute the difference. 
To measure risk-adjusted returns, the Sharpe Ratio was calculated on each asset 
class portfolio.  The Sharpe Ratio is a measure of return obtained per unit of risk as 
measured by standard deviation.  The return typically is measured using an average of 
excess return (return minus the risk-free rate); however this study uses a compound 
annual growth rate (CAGR) less the risk-free as measured by the 30-day Treasury bill. 
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This essentially is a measure of financial efficiency that measures how well the portfolio 
produces the return for every unit of risk taken. 
Sharpe Ratio = Return (portfolio) – Return (risk-free) / Standard Deviation 
(portfolio) 
The Sortino Ratio was developed by Dr. Frank Sortino of the Pension Research 
Institute and is a variation of the Sharpe Ratio except that it is only focused on downside 
volatility; not total volatility, which considers both the upside volatility (good) and the 
downside volatility (bad).  It was developed to ensure a manager or fund is not 
penalized for the good risk.  The statistic is determined, like the Sharpe, by adjusting the 
return using the risk-free 30-day Treasury bill.  The downside risk, as opposed to 
standard deviation, is calculated using semi-deviation, which is a measure of dispersion 
of returns falling below zero. 
Sortino Ratio = r − risk free/ Semi-variance  of downside 
r= monthly return 
rf = risk free 
Semi-Variance  =  �1
𝑛𝑛
∗ ∑ (−𝑟𝑟)^2�1/2 
n= the total number of observations 
r= the monthly return below zero 
 
Next, using a method similar to the Fama-French (1992) methodology, the small-
, mid- and large-asset classifications were disaggregated to form nine new portfolios: 
small value, small neutral, small growth, mid value, mid neutral, mid growth, large 
value, large neutral, and large growth. This was done by forming sorts of stocks on 
market value and book-to-market value.  As noted above, in December of each year 
from 1951 to 2014, all stocks are ranked on size using the Russell methodology to break 
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the stocks into small, mid, and large.  A shorter time period is used since the 
COMPUSTAT data only includes balance sheet data as of 1951.  However, the database 
does not contain every company found in the CRSP database, especially with mid- and 
small-cap stocks.  The database becomes more robust after 1970.   
All the stocks are then divided into three different book-to-market categories 
based on the breakpoints for the bottom 30% (growth), middle 40% (neutral), and top 
30% (value) of the ranked values of BE/ME for all stocks. Book value of common equity 
(BE) is defined similar to the Fama-French (1992) study, which uses the Compustat book 
value of stockholders equity plus balance-sheet deferred taxes minus book value of 
preferred stock.  The BE/ME represents the book common equity for the fiscal year 
ending in the calendar year divided by the market equity at the same time.  
Negative BE firms were not used when calculating the breakpoints for BE/ME or 
when forming the size-BE/ME portfolios. Only firms with ordinary common equity (as 
classified by CRSP) are included in the tests.  The nine portfolios are constructed from 
the intersection of the three size and three BE/ME groups.  For example, small value 
(SV) contains the stocks in the small market value group, but also in the highest BE 
group.  Monthly value-weighted returns are then calculated for the nine portfolios at 
the end of every year.  To be included, a company must have CRSP stock prices for 
December and  Compustat book common equity for the same year.  Thus, there are 
some firms missing balance sheet data in Compustat, so all the firms represented in the 
Russell proxy portfolios may not be represented in the nine new portfolios. Academics 
have termed this issue, and others related to matching CRSP and Compustat, a 
41 
“selection bias” and there have been some arguments this may distort the results in the 
value premium research, including Breen and Korajczyk (1994) and Kothari, Shanken and 
Sloan (1995).  However, Davis (1994) used the Moody’s manuals to estimate the B/M 
variables pre-Compustat and found the value premium still existed.  While La Porta 
(1993) found similar results, and Chan, Jagadeesh, and Lakonishok (1995) state this issue 
is “greatly exaggerated.” 
The portfolios were value-weighted so we can mimic portfolios designed by 
other index providers like Russell and MSCI.  The value and growth weights were 
assigned separately using the Fama/French measurement for value and growth, while 
Russell uses three variables in the determination of growth and value.  They use the 
book-to-price (B/P) ratio with a ranking process, like FF, while their growth metric is 
determined using the Institutional Brokers' Estimate System forecast for medium-term 
earnings growth (2-year) and sales-per-share historical growth (5-year).   
To complete the migration analysis, a database was developed by merging the 
CRSP stock-level data related to prices and market value with delisting codes and  
Compustat industry-level data; specifically SIC codes.  The delisting codes were generally 
related to mergers and stock exchanges in addition to bankruptcies and firms going 
private.  Mergers and stock exchanges were coded between 200-390, while everything 
else was considered “other delisting.”  As noted in Table 7, the high-level SIC codes (1-
12) were used to segment each stock into the following industries: consumer non-
durable, consumer durable, manufacturing, energy, chemical, business equipment, 
telecommunications, utilities, retail and wholesale shops, healthcare, finance and other.  
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Table 7 SIC Code Descriptions 
SIC Code Descriptions  
CONSUMER NON-DURABLES FOOD, TOBACCO, TEXTILES, APPAREL, 
LEATHER, TOYS 
CONSUMER DURABLES CARS, TVS, FURNITURE, HOUSEHOLD 
APPLIANCES 
MANUFACTURING MACHINERY, TRUCKS, PLANES, OFFICE 
FURNITURE, PAPER, COM PRINTING 
ENERGY OIL, GAS, AND COAL EXTRACTION AND 
PRODUCTS 
CHEMICALS CHEMICALS AND ALLIED PRODUCTS 
 
BUSINESS EQUIPMENT COMPUTERS, SOFTWARE, AND 
ELECTRONIC EQUIPMENT 
TELECOM TELEPHONE AND TELEVISION 
TRANSMISSION           
UTILITIES 
 
REGULATED UTILITIES 
WHOLESALE, RETAIL, AND SOME 
SERVICES 
LAUNDRIES, REPAIR SHOPS 
HEALTHCARE MEDICAL EQUIPMENT, DRUGS, AND 
HEALTH SERVICES 
FINANCE COMMERCIAL BANKS, INSURANCE, REAL 
ESTATE, SECURITY & COMMODITY BROKERS 
OTHER MINES, CONSTRUCTION, BUILDING 
MATERIALS, TRANSPORTATION, HOTELS, 
BUSINESS SERVICES, ENTERTAINMENT 
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Each stock in each size category is identified and marked when it migrates to 
another asset class.  For example, a mid-cap becomes a large-cap or small-cap, from one 
year to the next, or it delists because of a merger or bankruptcy.  Since Compustat data 
was used, the analysis was conducted on stocks after 1950.  Since the Compustat data is 
limited up to 1970, the analysis zeroed in on all migrations after 1980, to focus on mid-
caps’ superior performance from 1980 to 2014.  Additionally, once each migrated 
security was marked, and assigned a delisting and industry code, the portfolio style 
(value, neutral, growth) was linked with each stock in addition to market value and 
return, although the data is very limited for vanishes due to delistings. 
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V RESULTS 
Two proxies for mid-cap were created, one called the Russell proxy, based on the 
Russell methodology, and another called the CRSP proxy, which used the CRSP 3-5 
deciles of CRSP 1-10 to estimate mid-cap returns.  As noted in Appendix A, both proxies 
provide a similar risk-return profile.   
The Russell proxy shows that since the inception date of 1928 to the end of 
2014, mid-caps have outperformed large-cap stocks.  What’s interesting is although the 
small-company stocks had a slightly higher CAGR (Compound Average Growth Rate), 
10.9% versus 10.3%, the mid-cap returns were very close, only a 0.6% difference.  This 
was evident in the CRSP measurement as well, with a 0.7% difference.  However, 
comparing the difference using a measurement similar to the Fama-French small-cap 
premium methodology (SMB), the difference in return between the mid- and small-cap 
monthly average returns is not significantly different from zero ( MMS=-0.11, t-stat <2), 
while the difference between large and mid is significant (MML=0.16, t-stat>2).  This 
answers the issue around persistence of the mid-cap premium over small and large.  The 
premium exists and persists through time relative to large-cap stocks (Hypothesis 1), but 
any notion that mid-caps outperform small-cap stocks, like what happened in the 1980s, 
is dispelled by this analysis, so proving Hypothesis 1a incorrect.  What’s more interesting 
is when you look at risk as measured by standard deviation, the standard deviation for 
mid-caps during this 86-year-period falls well below the small-cap standard deviation.  
Thus, using the risk-adjusted measure of return like the Sharpe ratio, we find mid-caps 
have better risk-adjusted returns relative to small and large, which proves Hypothesis 2 
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correct.  Using the Russell proxies, since the inception, the mid-cap portfolio produced a 
Sharpe ratio of 0.32 versus 0.30 for the small and large portfolios.  The results were 
even better over the 50-year-period, reflecting 0.33 for mid-cap versus 0.27 for large ad 
0.29 for small.   
This becomes more evident when you analyze the risk-adjusted return using the 
Sortino ratio, a measure that only focuses on downside risk and return.  The risk-
adjusted returns are even more attractive, 0.52 for mid-caps, 0.49 for small-caps, and 
0.47 for large caps.  Thus, the story is mid-caps have higher returns than large-cap 
stocks.  We would expect this. However, the returns are very close to the small-cap 
return.  We would not expect this.  From an academic perspective, this contradicts the 
small-firm effect and should not be so.  You would expect mid-cap returns to fall in the 
very middle of large- and small-cap returns.  We are showing this is true with risk, but 
not return.  Thus, an investor can achieve a return close to small-caps with much less 
volatility and downside risk -- an attractive proposition for any investor. 
Moreover, practitioners like to look at rolling returns, since any client is only 
willing to give anyone 3-5 years to produce superior returns to the market.  Thus, it 
appears mid-cap may fit that bill better than small-caps.  As noted in Appendix B, the 
rolling 3-, 5- and 10-year probability of achieving a mid-cap return over large cap tells an 
interesting story.  Over the rolling 3- and 5-year periods from 1928-2014, mid-caps were 
more likely to have higher returns over large than small-caps (i.e., 56% versus 54%, and 
67% versus 59%).  Even in the 10-year rolling return, mid-caps were just as likely to have 
higher returns as small-caps, so proving the Hypothesis 1b partially true.  Again, when 
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analyzing the mid-cap premium using a rolling average the 3-, 5- and 10-year rolling 
returns, there is significance over all time periods (MML=1.65, 1.70, & 1.60 respectively, 
t>2).  Thus, there may be some diversification benefits to adding mid-caps to a portfolio 
of stocks.   
Regarding the claim that mid-cap stocks outperform both small- and large-cap 
stocks, this appears not to be true over long period of times.  We do show over the 30-
year period from 1985 to 2014, mid-caps did outperform small and large (11.52% versus 
10.12%, and 10.7% respectively); however, the mid-cap premium over small and large 
(MMS/MML) did not reveal this difference was significant (MMS=0.07, MML =0.09, t<2), 
which proves that the outperformance over the 30- and 50-year period cannot be 
expected going forward. 
Once the proxies were developed and analyzed, to help delve deeper in the 
superior risk-adjusted returns of mid-caps, we established nine different style categories 
using the Russell proxy: large-cap growth, large-cap neutral, large-cap value, mid-cap 
growth, mid-cap neutral, mid-cap value, small-cap growth, small-cap neutral, and small-
cap value.   
Additionally, as noted in the literature review, value stocks outperform growth 
stocks over time and small-cap-value stocks have outperformed all asset classes 
historically.  This analysis wanted to confirm this effect existed for mid-caps. 
For the past 50 years, mid-cap value stocks did outperform growth stocks 
(13.60% versus 7.61%), while small-cap value significantly beat small-cap growth by over 
10% (17.13% vs. 6.52%).  Large-cap value performed better than large-growth stocks, 
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but by a much smaller margin of 1.6%.  When validating the value premium across all 
asset classes using a method similar to the Fama-French monthly return method, over 
the 50-year period, the mid- and small-cap value premiums ( 0.44 and 0.77, t>2) were 
significant, while large-cap was not. At the same time, the correlation shows there are 
diversification benefits to adding mid-cap value stocks to a portfolio.  As noted in 
Appendix J, the mid-cap value premium reveals a correlation coefficient of 0.56 versus 
the large-cap premium and 0.79 versus small-caps. 
What’s interesting is the performance in the growth category across asset 
classes. While the small-cap value asset class bested mid- and large-value stocks (by 
3.5% and 5.5% per year), compared to only a 0.21% difference when looking at small-
cap and mid-caps in aggregate, small-cap growth stocks significantly underperformed 
mid- and large-growth stocks.  This also occurs despite significantly greater volatility 
risk.  Thus, the Sharpe Ratio for small-cap growth stocks over this time period equates to 
0.06 versus 0.12 and 018 for mid- and large-growth.   This is counterintuitive since, given 
the research on the small-firm effect, all small-cap categories should at least outperform 
large-caps over an extended amount of time.  Even the small-cap neutral category 
achieved similar results beating the mid-cap and large-cap neutral portfolios by over 
2.5% and 3.5%. 
In other words, the dramatic underperformance in small-cap growth stocks 
appears to be dragging down the entire small-company category in aggregate.  This is 
interesting since the key to mid-cap stocks’ superior performance during the 1980 to 
2014 period appears to lie in the small-cap growth category.  Thus, this knowledge 
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changes the original question by not asking why mid-caps returns did so well during this 
time period, but instead asking why small-caps performed so poorly. 
V.1 Migration 
There are some common beliefs espoused by many practitioners regarding mid-
caps and how they may behave differently than small-caps.  Thus, the movements (or 
migrations) among small-, mid- and large-cap stocks were analyzed.  Moreover, the 
analysis allows us to provide more color around this issue related the unusual small-cap 
performance during the 1980-2014 time period, especially related to the small-cap 
growth category.  Again, a movement or migration may be a merger, bankruptcy, or a 
change in size category.  The movements were dissected by asset class and even by 
sector (SIC classification).  On average, as noted in the below table, about 17% of mid-
caps have some sort of movement every month, while only 10% of small-caps either 
merge, go bankrupt, or make the jump to mid-cap territory.  This makes sense since 
mid-caps have more places to migrate compared to small-caps; they can either drop to 
small-cap or jump to large-cap.  Chen et al (2010) also confirmed in his research that 
mid-caps tend to migrate more often.  A small-cap almost never leaps to the large-cap 
classification before spending some period of time as a mid-cap.  Of this 17% for mid-
cap movements, the majority migrate down to small-caps (about 60%) on average in any 
given year, while about 27% migrate up to large-caps, and 17% vanish via merger or 
delisting.  However, on average, over 95% of the time that a mid-cap vanishes, it’s due 
to a merger.  Thus, of the 17% of the mid-caps that move, on average, every year, over 
40% of the time, it is a positive transition.  Said another way, approximately 7% of mid-
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caps either merge or migrate to large-caps every year.  Since positive transitions, on 
average, have higher-market-caps, average $3.5B in market value versus $1.5B for 
negative transitions, this has an impact on returns, but not enough to definitively say it 
drives the mid-cap outperformance relative to small.  What’s more, according to 
Appendix L, the majority of positive transitions during the 1980-2013 time period came 
from the finance (23%) sector, which is significant since finance companies only 
represent 19% of the mid-cap category. Additionally, the business equipment sector 
represented 13% of the positive mid-cap transitions and 19% of negative transitions.  
There have been arguments that mid-caps have a better ability to benefit from 
merger and acquisition activity, which they do, but how does this compare to small-
caps?  Only about 4% of small-caps vanish every year due to mergers, while mid-cap 
mergers average around 4.25% of the category.  Thus, there is nothing unusual in the 
merger activity in mid-caps relative to small-caps, which proves Hypothesis 3 incorrect.  
This is also true with migrations that move up to a new asset class (on average, 2% of 
small-caps jump to mid-cap every year) while close to 3.5% of mid-caps jump to large-
caps.  Like mid-caps, these small-cap jumps in category were also dominated by the 
finance and business equipment industry sectors during the 1980-2013 time period. 
Furthermore, Fama and French (2007) state, “In the end, the size premium in 
average returns for 1927-2006 traces almost entirely to the high average excess returns 
(more than 50 percent) earned by the 8-12% of the market capitalization of small-cap 
stocks that moves to a big-cap portfolio from one year to the next.”  They go on to say 
the negative transitions in small-caps case bankruptcies and delistings had a large 
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negative returns, but a small-market-value impact (2% of the small-cap market cap).  
This syncs with our study that looks at the 1980-2013 timeframe in that small-cap 
positive transitions (including both small- to large-mergers) represents about 15% of the 
market capitalizations and an average 85% return.  However, for mid-caps, the positive 
transitions represent about 11% of the market value with an average 65% return, while 
the negative transitions represent 6% of market value.  Thus, there does not appear to 
be evidence the mid-cap positive transitions are superior to small-cap positive 
transitions.  (As a side note, the return data on mergers is not completely accurate since 
it is difficult to calculate return of a delisting on a partial-year basis.  Thus, the return on 
mergers is estimated using the previous year returns.) 
Regarding “fallen angels” (stocks that fall from large to mid or mid to small), on 
average, only about 3% of new mid-caps consist of a new fallen angels (formerly large-
caps) in any given year.  While on average, about 8% of new mid-caps consist of a newly 
minted “rising star”, small-caps that become mid-caps.  Thus, this challenges the 
assumption that the majority of mid-cap returns are either driven by fallen angels or 
rising stars; the numbers do not appear significant enough to have a major impact.  
The industry data on overall positive and negative movements in the small- and 
mid-stock categories seem to sync with the changes in industries overtime.  For 
example, from 1928 to 2014, the percentage of public companies in finance moved from 
5% to 22%, and business equipment goes from 2% of all stocks in 1928, to 20% in 2000, 
and down to 14% in 2014.  Thus, the most movements in small-cap and mid-cap were in 
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these two industries.  This did not change much from 1980 to 2014 except for the 
business equipment taking a much larger role during that time. 
However, as noted above, the small-cap growth category returns were unusually 
low over the past 30-50 years.  This also occurred, although to a lesser extent, in the 
mid-cap growth category.  When dissecting the small-cap growth into industries, as 
expected, the business equipment sector plays an outsized role in positive and negative 
small-cap growth movements; however, the healthcare sector has a significant impact 
also within this category (16% of all small-cap growth movements versus a 7% 
representation in the overall small-cap category).   The same observation was not found 
in the mid-cap growth category, so the answer to the small-cap growth 
underperformance could possibly be found in the business equipment and healthcare 
sectors. 
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Table 8 Migrations 
 
  
Total Small-Cap Total Mid-Cap Total Large-Cap
All Migrations Movement Movement Movement
10-Year 11% 17% 11%
20-Year 13% 20% 15%
30-Year 13% 19% 14%
50-Year 12% 18% 12%
70-Year 11% 16% 12%
Since Incpt (1928) 10% 17% 12%
Movements by Asset Class Descriptions Average Since Inception
Small Vanish Delisting or Merger 80%
Small to Mid Small-cap to Mid-Cap 20%
Small to Large Small-Cap to Lg Cap 0%
Mid Vanish Delisting or Merger 22%
Mid to Small Mid-cap to Sm-Cap 58%
Mid to Large Mid-Cap to Lg Cap 21%
Large Vanish Delisting or Merger 15%
Large to Mid Lg-Cap to Mid Cap 85%
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VI DISCUSSION 
The analysis revealed middle-capitalization stocks have had higher returns than 
small-cap and large-cap stocks over the past 50 years.  At the same time, going back to 
1928, mid-cap stocks outperformed large caps and have had returns very close to small-
cap returns with much less risk; thus, much higher risk-adjusted returns.  At the surface, 
mid-cap stocks look very attractive and, based on these achievements, any investment 
company would seriously consider a mid-cap allocation in a diversified portfolio.  Given 
these attractive statistics, one could even question why the mid-cap should not replace 
the small-cap allocation entirely.  These facts have been touted by almost every mid-cap 
portfolio manager in business today.  However, this analysis places some academic rigor 
around the asset class and brings to light several very important facts about the superior 
performance of mid-caps. 
First, when segmenting each asset class into different styles (growth, neutral 
value), the mid-cap neutral and value categories underperformed small-caps.  Second, 
the mid-cap premium over small-caps is not statistically significant or persistent over the 
time period studied.  Third, when studying migration, mid-caps do not appear to exhibit 
unusually high merger activity or jumps up to the large category relative to small-caps.  
In fact, they tend to migrate downward, which can be a drag on performance.  Fourth, 
small-cap growth stocks appear to be dragging down the entire small-cap category, 
creating the unusually small return difference between mid-caps and small-caps over 
the extended time period going back to 1928. 
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Thus, demystifying the mid-cap myth involves investigating not why mid-caps 
have done so well, but why small-caps have done so poorly.  Mid-caps have 
outperformed large caps.  This is in line with what we have learned from the research 
around the small-cap effect, so you would expect this given the higher-volatility risk and 
smaller market capitalization.  However, you would not expect mid-caps to have higher 
returns than small-caps over the 50-year-period and since inception, you would not 
expect them to have returns close to small stocks.  You would expect the risk and return 
to be equally spaced between small and large.  So, why have small-caps done so poorly 
relative to mid-caps?  The answer appears to lie in the CRSP database.  As stated in the 
literature review, Mcquarrie (2009) notes the CRSP database has several limitations.  
The most glaring is that before 1962, all the stocks trading on the OTC on exchanges in 
Boston, Chicago, Philadelphia, etc., were excluded.  If these stocks were included, they 
would most likely be deemed small-caps. 
After 1962, the American Stock Exchange is added to the CRSP dataset and, most 
importantly, the NASDAQ stocks were included after 1973. Table 9 notes the number of 
stocks deemed small-caps double in 1963 and again in 1974.   
Table 9 Change In Number Of Stocks In CRSP 
 
 
Total Mid-Cap ($M) Small-cap ($M)
Year t Large-cap g Mid-Cap g Small-Cap g # of Stocks g Avg Mkt Cap Avg Mkt Cap
1962 104      284         720         1,108        285              44                  
1963 116      12% 350         23% 1,468      104% 1,934        75% 292              28                  
1973 160      468         1,849      2,477        338              31                  
1974 179      12% 661         41% 3,918      112% 4,758        92% 203              15                  
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The inclusion of these new exchanges to the CRSP database changes the 
characteristics of the small-cap asset class dramatically.  This is noted in Fama and 
French (2004) in their study of new lists on NYSE-AMEX-NASDAQ from 1973-2001.  They 
state NASDAQ absorbs most of the OTC stocks noted above and for the post-1972 
period.  As noted in Table 9, the majority of these listings go to the small-cap category, 
while bringing down the average market capitalization of small-caps to 15MM, from 
31MM.  This is mainly driven by NASDAQ’s less stringent listing requirements during this 
period.  NASDAQ did not even impose a minimum net income requirement ($750,000) 
until 1997.  Fama and French (2004) state that the profitability of new lists from 
NASDAQ and AMEX during the 1980-2001 period drifts significantly downward, even 
several years after listing.  And, especially as the new list becomes more Internet-related 
in the 1990s, the firms tend to be low-profitable, but high-growth companies.  This 
drives the probability of survival for new lists down from 67% to 37%.  
Moreover, confirming the results in the migration study, the FF study states 
healthcare and high-tech firms become a bigger portion of the new lists, moving from 
about 20% in the 1970s, to around 40% in the 1990s, to close to 55% in 2001.  This is 
interesting given that we know from this analysis small-cap growth firms drive down the 
performance of the entire small-cap category and, as stated in the results section, 
healthcare and business equipment play an outsized role in the small-cap growth 
negative migration movements.  What’s more, the Fama/French study shows that the 
business equipment (called HiTec in their paper) and healthcare profitability drops more 
than the other industries from 1972-2001.  The percentage of seasoned firms in these 
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industries with negative earnings, rises from 9% and 5% in the 1970s to 58% and 50% in 
2001.  So, it looks as if these two sectors are the fast-growing, unprofitable, small-cap 
growth firms that had a significant impact on the category and worthy of future study.  
As a side note, the FF study did not consider finance companies, which we know play a 
big role in all the stock categories (small, mid and large) during this time.   
This brings up the issue of profitability and how it relates to mid-caps.  We know 
the low-profit, fast-growing firms are an impediment to small-cap returns.  This is noted 
in Asness (2015) when he states the size premium research is weak; however, when you 
screen out the low-quality (or low-profit) “junk” firms, the size premium becomes very 
robust and persistent in the U.S. and international markets.  In other words, weeding 
out the least profitable firms changes the relationship between size and the cross-
section of expected returns.  This means the mid-cap premium during the 50-year-
period noted above goes away when considering profitability.  This is evident when 
replacing the Russell small-cap proxy data with a small index that excludes the least-
profitable stocks and comparing to mid- and large-caps. 
As noted in the below table, the Dimensional U.S. Small Index, which contains 
this profitability exclusion, outperforms over the time periods studied with a statistically 
significant monthly premium versus mid- and large-sized stocks (0.21 and 0.36, t>2).  
Finally, the four-factor model in Appendix L, regresses the returns of the various asset 
classes against a market, value (HML), size (SMB) and profitability (Profit) factor.  It 
validates the small-cap-growth category relative to the small-cap-neutral and value 
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category has a negative relationship with the profitability factor and contains the 
smallest (SMB=0.88, t>0), least profitable (profit=-0.08, t>0) companies in the category. 
 
Table 10 Dimensional Small-Cap Indices (Profitability Exclusion) 
Source: Dimensional Fund Advisors 
 
 
Thus, one can conclude the mid-cap category acts as a de facto profitability 
screen serving a Darwin-like natural selection function in the evolution of small-cap 
stocks – meaning the least fit, unprofitable small-caps eventually die off and never get 
the chance to become larger and stronger. 
 
VI.1 Contributions to Practice 
This research challenges the notion that mid-caps are superior to small-cap 
stocks and evaluates the mid-cap anomaly over the past 30-50 years.  As stated above, 
the issue is not that mid-caps are superior; it is why small-caps are inferior.  A 
practitioner can now view the claims of mid-cap fund managers with a skeptical eye.  
Performance
01/1928 - 12/2014
Data Series CAGR Std. Dev. 
Russell Large 8.87                               17.77                          
Russell Mid 10.27                             21.04                          
Dimensional US Small Cap Index 12.22                             24.35                          
Performance
 01/1980 - 12/2014
CAGR Std. Dev. 
Russell Large 11.11                             15.12                          
Russell Mid 12.15                             17.08                          
Dimensional US Small Cap Index 14.11                             18.68                          
58 
The 30-year outperformance of mid-caps touted in most white papers has been shown 
to be insignificant.  Yes, mid-caps do reveal superior risk-adjusted returns over the time 
period studied; however, it is not the “Goldilocks” scenario espoused in most research 
papers by the top mid-cap mutual fund managers.  This is a special asset class, but not 
for the reasons most analyst state.  Despite the claims made by managers, like mid-caps 
benefit more from merger and acquisition activity or have deeper management 
resources than their small-cap counterparts, the mid-cap category outperforms because 
small-cap growth stocks have underperformed. 
With that said, mid-caps did show superior risk-adjusted returns over the time 
periods studied, by offering returns close to mid-caps with much less risk.  Thus, an 
asset allocator could approach this in various ways.  To the passive portfolio manager, 
one could say that if you passively allocate to small-cap stocks using an index like the 
Russell 2000, you should seriously consider changing or weighting heavily to mid-caps 
for this portion of the portfolio.  Or, simply bifurcate the small-cap asset class into 
growth/value and significantly overweight the value portion since most of the 
unprofitable small-caps are typical found in the growth category.  Moreover, the 
analysis showed value outperformed growth, so value-tilting a passive portfolio can 
increase returns, while at the same time there are some diversification benefits to 
adding mid-value to complement a small-cap value tilt. 
To the active asset allocator, you should have an allocation to mid-caps in your 
portfolio; however, the small-cap portfolio (and, to some extent, mid-caps) should have 
some sort of screen for profitability.  Whether you sort and weight the portfolio to the 
59 
most profitable stocks, screen out the least profitable small-caps, like Fama/French, or 
the bottom 30%, like Cliff Asness, profitability should be considered in any small-cap 
portfolio.  Mid-caps are still good investments.  Allocations should be made to the 
category since mid-caps offer a good compromise for someone not comfortable with 
the risk inherent in small-sized companies, but has the risk tolerance of something more 
than what large-cap stocks offer.  
VI.2 Contributions to Theory 
Academic research has centered on small- and large-capitalization companies 
and has neglected to consider the middle-market stocks, despite their popularity with 
practitioners. The mid-cap asset class can be researched much further so, to the 
academic, we can say mid-caps fall in line with the research around the small-firm effect 
and CAPM misspecification, whereby the smaller the firm in market capitalization, the 
higher the return.  Having said this, mid-caps are unusual in that they have provided 
superior risk-adjusted returns versus large- and small-company stocks over the time 
period studied.  This occurs because of issues inherent in the small-cap asset class, 
specifically small-cap growth.  According to Fama-French (2004), the inclusion of 
NASDAQ stocks in the CRSP database drove an onslaught of small unprofitable 
companies to the small-cap stock category after 1972.  Thus, one could delve into this 
issue further by investigating the NASDAQ exchange change in standards increased even 
more since the Fama/French study ended in 2001.  As it stands now, we know the 
exchange listing requirements have become more rigid over the years and have even 
added a minimum amount of net income to the list of prerequisites.  Have the standards 
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changed since 2001?  We know from Gao, Ritter, & Zhu, (2013) that less companies are 
going public, so is the profile of a typical small-cap, new-list changing?  We know most 
of the unprofitable companies came from the technology and healthcare sectors.  Is this 
changing?  For example, are the new-lists stronger and more profitable today?  If so, 
mid-caps may not reflect superior returns relative to small-company stocks in the 
future.  More interesting is the impact on the small-cap value premium.  If the profile of 
a small-cap growth stocks changes, can we challenge the magnitude of the small-cap 
value premium espoused by Fama-French?  If so, the small-cap value premium may drop 
significantly (or even disappear) after transaction costs.  
In conclusion, this research demystifies the mid-cap myth, by dissecting the asset 
class and identifying the true drivers of the mid-cap stocks relative and absolute returns 
over the highly advertised 30-year period, in addition to the time period beginning in 
1928.  Mid-caps have a role in investors’ portfolios and academic research.  The 
practitioner just needs to understand how mid-caps relate to small-caps and develop a 
strategy and allocation to optimize their role in any portfolio.   Academics can delve 
deeper, not only into small-caps growth stocks and their role in the small-stock 
category, but also into their effect on the value premium going forward. 
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APPENDICES 
Appendix A: Russell Proxy Results 
The sample consists of all New York Stock Exchange (NYSE), the NYSE MKT (formerly known as 
the American Stock Exchange), NYSE ARCA (previously known as the Archipelago Exchange), the American 
Stock Exchange (AMEX), and NASDAQ ordinary common stocks that appear on the Center for Research in 
Securities Prices (CRSP) and on COMPUSTAT tapes with data available for certain income statement and 
balance sheet items. We exclude all CRSP share codes except 10 and 11; thus there are no American 
Depository Receipts (ADRs), closed-end mutual funds, foreign stocks, unit investment trusts, and 
American trusts.  We do include REITS (CRSP share code 18) since they are part of the indices used by 
practitioners. 
The large cap category consists of the first 200 stocks of the Russell 3000, which equates to 
approximately 65% of the total market capitalization of the Russell 3000.  The Russell Mid-Cap Index 
equates to the next 65% to 90%, and the residual, the small cap index (Russell 2000), equates to the 
bottom 10%. 
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Russell Proxy
1928 1928
CAGR 10-yr 20-yr 30-yr 50-yr 70-yr -2014 -1970
Russell Large 7.04         9.04         10.70      9.01         10.36      8.87         7.76         
Russell Mid-Cap 9.56         10.44      11.52      10.77      11.82      10.27      9.25         
Russell Small 8.01         10.35      10.12      10.98      11.85      10.88      11.14      
Std Dev 10-yr 20-yr 30-yr 50-yr 70-yr 28'-'14 28'-'70
Russell Large 14.35      15.43      15.18      14.97      14.25      17.77      20.10      
Russell Mid-Cap 17.42      17.44      17.08      17.46      16.37      21.04      24.09      
Russell Small 20.67      20.35      19.41      20.21      18.80      24.58      28.47      
Sharpe Ratio 10-yr 20-yr 30-yr 50-yr 70-yr 28-'14 28'-'70
Russell Large 0.39         0.41         0.46         0.27         0.44         0.30         0.30         
Russell Mid-Cap 0.47         0.45         0.46         0.33         0.47         0.32         0.31         
Russell Small 0.32         0.38         0.33         0.29         0.41         0.30         0.33         
Risk Free ( 30 day T-Bill) 1.42        2.66        3.68        5.04        4.10        3.46        1.8
Sortino Ratio 10-yr 20-yr 30-yr 50-yr 70-yr 28-'14
Russell Large 0.56         0.61         0.70         0.41         0.70         0.47         
Russell Mid-Cap 0.68         0.66         0.68         0.51         0.74         0.52         
Russell Small 0.47         0.57         0.49         0.45         0.64         0.49         
Risk Free ( 30 day T-Bill) 1.42         2.66         3.68         5.04         4.10         3.46         
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Appendix B: Crsp Proxy Results 
A second more academic measurement focused on the CRSP 3-5 deciles was developed, which is 
a sub-set of the CRSP 10 decile index data popular in the Fama/French and other academic studies.  As 
with the Russell proxy, we used CRSP share codes 10, 11, and 18 ( REITs).  Using the NYSE breakpoints 
provided by Ken French (French 2016) we divided all stocks in the CRSP database into 10 deciles, the 1st 
decile contains the top 10% of stocks in terms of cumulative market capitalization and the tenth or 
bottom decile contains the smallest 10%.  The CRSP 1st and 2nd deciles were grouped and deemed large 
caps, the next 3rd, , 4th , and 5th, deciles were grouped and deemed mid-caps, and the 6th through 10th 
deciles made up the small caps.  From there, the stocks were ranked on market value and a value-
weighted return was created for each asset class. Based on end-of-year market values on December 31, 
we categorized every stock on Jan 1st of the following year as a large (CRSP 1-2), mid (CRSP 3-5), or small 
(CRSP 6-10).   
 
 
 
CRSP Proxy
1928-
CAGR 10-yr 20-yr 30-yr 50-yr 70-yr 2014
CRSP Large ( Decile 1-2) 7.21         9.34         10.93      9.18         10.52      9.09         
CRSP Mid-Cap ( Decile 3-5) 9.84         11.05      12.14      11.18      12.12      10.68      
CRSP Small (Decile 6-10) 8.25         10.41      10.65      11.19      11.96      11.38      
Std Dev 10-yr 20-yr 30-yr 50-yr 70-yr 1928
CRSP Large 14.40      15.37      15.11      14.93      14.21      18.05      
CRSP Mid-Cap 17.94      18.01      17.43      17.71      16.63      21.90      
CRSP Small 20.24      20.31      19.38      19.98      18.66      25.94      
Sharpe Ratio 10-yr 20-yr 30-yr 50-yr 70-yr 1928
CRSP Large 0.40         0.44         0.48         0.28         0.45         0.31         
CRSP Mid-Cap 0.47         0.47         0.49         0.35         0.48         0.33         
CRSP Small 0.34         0.38         0.36         0.31         0.42         0.31         
Risk Free ( 30 day T-Bill) 1.42         2.66         3.68         5.04         4.10         3.46         
SORTINO Ratio 10-yr 20-yr 30-yr 50-yr 70-yr 1928
CRSP Large 0.58         0.64         0.73         0.43         0.72         0.49         
CRSP Mid-Cap 0.69         0.70         0.73         0.54         0.77         0.53         
CRSP Small 0.50         0.58         0.54         0.48         0.66         0.52         
Risk Free ( 30 day T-Bill) 1.42         2.66         3.68         5.04         4.10         3.46         
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RUSSELL PROXY BY ASSET CLASS
Total Mid-Cap ($M) Small-cap ($M) Total Mid-Cap ($M) Small-cap ($M)
Year t Large Mid-Cap Small-Cap # of Stocks Avg mkt cap Avg Mkt Cap Year Large Mid-Cap Small-Cap # of Stocks Avg mkt cap Avg Mkt Cap
1928 64            141              353                  558                104                   18                        1971 167          451          1,656      2,274         410                   47                        
1929 68            152              369                  589                87                      11                        1972 179          475          1,716      2,370         420                   46                        
1930 65            142              469                  676                66                      7                           1973 160          468          1,849      2,477         338                   31                        
1931 53            132              503                  688                37                      4                           1974 179          661          3,918      4,758         203                   15                        
1932 44            123              514                  681                39                      4                           1975 168          612          3,659      4,439         321                   22                        
1933 44            113              507                  664                65                      8                           1976 191          628          3,676      4,495         382                   29                        
1934 54            133              481                  668                52                      7                           1977 217          680          3,699      4,596         329                   29                        
1935 58            143              470                  671                71                      9                           1978 247          753          3,523      4,523         296                   29                        
1936 60            150              473                  683                82                      13                        1979 257          774          3,409      4,440         361                   36                        
1937 66            175              469                  710                43                      5                           1980 279          777          3,348      4,404         428                   42                        
1938 58            156              535                  749                65                      8                           1981 267          791          3,524      4,582         421                   39                        
1939 63            164              521                  748                55                      7                           1982 291          817          3,847      4,955         448                   42                        
1940 57            166              530                  753                50                      7                           1983 285          811          3,815      4,911         548                   53                        
1941 57            175              533                  765                42                      5                           1984 323          961          4,176      5,460         434                   40                        
1942 58            174              542                  774                46                      6                           1985 295          879          4,446      5,620         621                   53                        
1943 60            178              532                  770                56                      9                           1986 293          878          4,447      5,618         677                   55                        
1944 69            201              506                  776                58                      11                        1987 280          855          4,711      5,846         681                   47                        
1945 79            231              486                  796                75                      16                        1988 256          774          5,182      6,212         862                   55                        
1946 98            257              468                  823                56                      12                        1989 257          759          4,966      5,982         991                   61                        
1947 102          264              507                  873                53                      11                        1990 226          670          4,886      5,782         987                   53                        
1948 99            269              541                  909                51                      10                        1991 192          593          4,892      5,677         1,629                95                        
1949 93            267              576                  936                63                      11                        1992 219          691          4,827      5,737         1,564                103                      
1950 100          268              596                  964                76                      15                        1993 257          797          4,790      5,844         1,516                112                      
1951 102          283              599                  984                86                      15                        1994 300          961          5,106      6,367         1,204                94                        
1952 102          275              627                  1,004             98                      17                        1995 299          1,010      5,447      6,756         1,523                123                      
1953 98            273              646                  1,017             98                      16                        1996 289          1,031      5,607      6,927         1,860                147                      
1954 98            262              656                  1,016             149                   25                        1997 287          1,120      6,023      7,430         2,254                173                      
1955 99            267              655                  1,021             172                   29                        1998 254          1,064      6,127      7,445         2,687                178                      
1956 90            267              662                  1,019             194                   31                        1999 165          792          6,059      7,016         4,619                295                      
1957 89            261              672                  1,022             177                   26                        2000 154          768          5,762      6,684         5,313                292                      
1958 87            250              707                  1,044             273                   42                        2001 150          661          5,569      6,380         5,231                308                      
1959 94            260              681                  1,035             281                   46                        2002 155          708          4,848      5,711         3,701                239                      
1960 95            273              687                  1,055             284                   42                        2003 159          685          4,444      5,288         5,091                386                      
1961 99            271              707                  1,077             345                   54                        2004 187          775          3,991      4,953         5,041                418                      
1962 104          284              720                  1,108             285                   44                        2005 210          817          3,878      4,905         4,896                418                      
1963 116          350              1,468               1,934             292                   28                        2006 217          798          3,834      4,849         5,345                476                      
1964 112          342              1,487               1,941             343                   32                        2007 215          805          3,760      4,780         5,416                433                      
1965 116          355              1,549               2,020             401                   42                        2008 191          700          3,794      4,685         3,452                278                      
1966 135          395              1,504               2,034             319                   33                        2009 156          625          3,645      4,426         5,549                446                      
1967 142          399              1,541               2,082             402                   54                        2010 179          655          3,327      4,161         6,183                523                      
1968 167          477              1,422               2,066             387                   61                        2011 203          686          3,145      4,034         5,320                462                      
1969 197          535              1,345               2,077             275                   39                        2012 191          631          3,065      3,887         6,555                579                      
1970 178          491              1,526               2,195             309                   36                        2013 190          627          2,967      3,784         8,597                821                      
Appendix C: Russell Proxy By Asset Class And Year 
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Since Inception TOTAL Movement Small Vanish Small to Mid Mid-Vanish Mid to Small Mid to Large Large Vanish Large to Mid
Consumer NonDur 7% 8% 7% 8% 7% 7% 7% 8%
Consumer Durables 3% 3% 3% 3% 4% 3% 3% 4%
Manufacturing 14% 13% 15% 11% 15% 14% 14% 15%
Energy 6% 5% 5% 9% 5% 7% 7% 6%
Chemicals 3% 2% 3% 1% 4% 5% 5% 5%
Bus Equipment 13% 15% 13% 9% 15% 11% 11% 10%
Telecom 3% 2% 3% 4% 3% 3% 3% 2%
Utilities 5% 1% 4% 6% 4% 10% 10% 11%
Retail & Whol Shops 10% 12% 10% 7% 10% 8% 8% 9%
Healthcare 6% 7% 6% 7% 5% 6% 6% 4%
Finance 16% 19% 16% 21% 14% 16% 16% 15%
Other 13% 14% 13% 14% 14% 10% 10% 11%
TOTAL 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100%
1980 to 2013 TOTAL Movement Small Vanish Small to Mid Mid-Vanish Mid to Small Mid to Large Large Vanish Large to Mid
Consumer NonDur 5% 5% 5% 8% 5% 5% 7% 6%
Consumer Durables 3% 2% 3% 3% 3% 3% 2% 4%
Manufacturing 10% 10% 10% 7% 11% 9% 7% 10%
Energy 5% 5% 4% 7% 5% 5% 11% 5%
Chemicals 3% 2% 2% 2% 3% 4% 4% 4%
Bus Equipment 17% 18% 17% 11% 19% 15% 4% 15%
Telecom 3% 3% 3% 5% 3% 4% 13% 3%
Utilities 3% 1% 3% 5% 4% 8% 2% 11%
Retail & Whol Shops 11% 11% 11% 7% 11% 10% 2% 10%
Healthcare 8% 9% 8% 7% 6% 6% 0% 4%
Finance 20% 21% 20% 24% 16% 21% 36% 18%
Other 13% 13% 12% 14% 13% 10% 11% 10%
TOTAL 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100%
Appendix D: Migration By Industry 
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Consumer 
NonDur
Consumer 
Durables Manufacturing Energy Chemicals
Bus 
Equipment Telecom Utilities Retail & Whol Shops Healthcare Finance Other
1928 17% 6% 22% 10% 3% 2% 1% 4% 8% 2% 5% 20%
1929 18% 6% 23% 9% 3% 2% 1% 3% 10% 1% 3% 20%
1930 18% 6% 24% 8% 4% 3% 1% 3% 9% 1% 4% 19%
1935 16% 5% 26% 7% 5% 3% 1% 3% 10% 2% 5% 18%
1940 16% 6% 27% 7% 5% 3% 1% 3% 10% 2% 5% 15%
1945 15% 6% 29% 6% 5% 4% 1% 4% 10% 2% 4% 14%
1950 15% 5% 28% 6% 5% 4% 1% 6% 9% 2% 5% 14%
1955 14% 5% 28% 5% 6% 3% 1% 9% 9% 2% 5% 13%
1960 12% 5% 29% 5% 6% 4% 1% 9% 9% 3% 5% 11%
1965 13% 5% 25% 5% 5% 7% 1% 6% 11% 2% 7% 12%
1970 13% 5% 23% 5% 5% 8% 2% 6% 11% 3% 7% 12%
1975 11% 4% 19% 5% 3% 8% 1% 4% 12% 3% 18% 12%
1980 9% 3% 18% 6% 3% 10% 1% 5% 12% 4% 18% 11%
1985 6% 3% 14% 7% 2% 16% 2% 4% 11% 6% 18% 12%
1990 6% 3% 11% 4% 2% 15% 2% 4% 10% 8% 23% 12%
1995 6% 3% 11% 4% 2% 15% 2% 3% 12% 9% 21% 12%
2000 5% 2% 9% 3% 2% 20% 3% 2% 11% 9% 21% 13%
2005 5% 2% 9% 3% 2% 18% 3% 3% 10% 11% 22% 12%
2010 5% 2% 9% 4% 2% 16% 3% 3% 9% 11% 23% 14%
2013 5% 2% 9% 4% 2% 14% 3% 3% 8% 10% 22% 19%
Appendix E: Stock Market Industry Breakout 
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Appendix F: Stock Market Style Classification By Year 
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Appendix G: Russell Style Results 
The small, mid, and large asset classifications were disaggregated to form nine new portfolios: small value, small 
neutral, small growth, mid value, mid neutral, mid growth, large value, large neutral, and large growth. This was done by 
forming sorts of stocks on market value and book-to-market value.  In December of each year from 1951 to 2014, all stocks 
are ranked on size using the Russell methodology to break the stocks into small, mid, and large.   
All the stocks are then divided into three different book to market categories based on the breakpoints  for the 
bottom 30% ( growth), middle 40% ( Neutral), and top 30% ( Value) of the ranked values of BE/ME for all stocks. Book value 
of common equity (BE) is defined similar to the Fama-French (1992) study, which uses the COMPUSTAT book value of 
stockholders equity plus balance-sheet deferred taxes minus book value of preferred stock.  The BE/ME represents the 
book common equity for the fiscal year ending in the calendar year divided by the market equity at the same time. 
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Small-Cap Style Proxy
CAGR 10-yr 20-yr 30-yr 50-yr
Small-Cap Growth 7.16         7.17         6.28         6.52         
Small-Cap Neutral 8.83         12.51      12.42      12.89      
Small-Cap Value 8.82         14.69      14.76      17.13      
Std Dev 10-yr 20-yr 30-yr 50-yr
Small-Cap Growth 20.77      23.63      22.75      23.71      
Small-Cap Neutral 19.66      18.09      17.63      18.72      
Small-Cap Value 25.96      22.98      21.31      21.43      
Sharpe Ratio 10-yr 20-yr 30-yr 50-yr
Small-Cap Growth 0.28         0.19         0.11         0.06         
Small-Cap Neutral 0.38         0.54         0.50         0.42         
Small-Cap Value 0.29         0.52         0.52         0.56         
Mid-Cap Style Proxy
CAGR 10-yr 20-yr 30-yr 50-yr
Mid-Cap Growth 8.49         7.41         9.17         7.61         
Mid-Cap Neutral 10.33      10.90      11.74      10.88      
Mid-Cap Value 9.12         12.49      13.33      13.60      
Std Dev 10-yr 20-yr 30-yr 50-yr
Mid-Cap Growth 17.39      22.11      20.94      21.04      
Mid-Cap Neutral 17.35      16.75      16.39      16.01      
Mid-Cap Value 18.60      17.50      17.18      17.44      
Sharpe Ratio 10-yr 20-yr 30-yr 50-yr
Mid-Cap Growth 0.41         0.21         0.26         0.12         
Mid-Cap Neutral 0.51         0.49         0.49         0.36         
Mid-Cap Value 0.41         0.56         0.56         0.49         
Risk Free ( 30 day T-Bill) 1.42        2.66        3.68        5.04        
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Large-Cap Style Proxy
CAGR 10-yr 20-yr 30-yr 50-yr
Large-Cap Growth 7.67      7.93      10.06    8.04      
Large-Cap Neutral 8.41      10.90    12.15    9.30      
Large-Cap Value 4.70      7.85      9.49      9.64      
Std Dev 10-yr 20-yr 30-yr 50-yr
Large-Cap Growth 13.88    16.59    16.80    16.93    
Large-Cap Neutral 13.94    15.06    14.80    15.18    
Large-Cap Value 18.38    18.01    16.94    15.85    
Sharpe Ratio 10-yr 20-yr 30-yr 50-yr
Large-Cap Growth 0.45      0.32      0.38      0.18      
Large-Cap Neutral 0.50      0.55      0.57      0.28      
Large-Cap Value 0.18      0.29      0.34      0.29      
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Appendix H: Size Premium Results 
(i) MML = the average monthly returns of the Russell mid-cap proxy less the average monthly returns of the Russell large-cap proxy 
(ii) SML = the average monthly returns of the Russell small-cap proxy less the average monthly returns of the Russell large-cap proxy 
(iii) MMS = the average monthly returns of the Russell mid-cap proxy less the average monthly returns of the Russell small-cap proxy 
 
  
  
Corr of Corr of
1928 Rolling Rolling Rolling Corr Corr Neg. Prem Pos. Prem
Premium  to 2014 10-yr 20-yr 30-yr 50-yr 3-year 5-year 10-year MML SML MML vs SML MML vs SML
MMS Mid-Small -0.11 -0.07 0.04 0.07 0.06 -1.15 -1.02 -0.80
t-stat 1.68 -0.45 0.31 0.72 0.73 1.75 2.02 -2.59
MML Mid-Large 0.16 0.24 0.14 0.09 0.17 1.65 1.69 1.60 1 0.86 0.73 0.75
t-stat 2.49 1.46 0.95 0.84 1.98 2.47 3.35 5.57
SML Small -Large 0.27      0.17   0.17   0.02   0.23   2.79 2.71 2.30 0.86 1 0.73 0.75
t-stat 2.42     0.63  0.79  0.11  1.60  2.24 2.83 4.30
Probability Rolling Rolling Rolling
Of Premium 3-yr 5-yr 10-yr
MMS 55% 51% 37%
MML 56% 67% 69%
Both at same t  18% 23% 17%
SML 54% 59% 69%
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Appendix I: Value And Size Premium Results 
All CRSP stocks are  divided into three different book to market categories based on the breakpoints  for the bottom 30% ( Growth), middle 40% ( Neutral), and 
top 30% ( Value) of the ranked values of BE/ME for all stocks. Book value of common equity (BE) is defined similar to the Fama-French (1992)  study, which uses the 
COMPUSTAT book value of stockholders equity plus balance-sheet deferred taxes minus book value of preferred stock.  The BE/ME represents the book common equity 
for the fiscal year ending in the calendar year divided by the market equity at the same time.  
We do not use negative BE firms when calculating the breakpoints for BE/ME or when forming the size-BE/ME portfolios. Only firms with ordinary common 
equity (as classified by CRSP) are included in the tests.  The nine portfolios are constructed from the intersection of the three size and three BE/ME groups.  For example, 
small value (SV) contains the stocks in the small market value group but also in the highest BE group.  Monthly value weighted returns are then calculated for the nine 
portfolios at the end of every year.  (i) The large value premium is the average monthly return of large-cap value stocks less large-cap growth stocks.  (ii) The mid-cap 
value premium is the average monthly return of mid-cap value stocks less mid-cap growth stocks (iii) The small-cap value premium is the average monthly return of 
small-cap value stocks less small-cap growth stocks 
  
 
10-yr 20-yr 30-yr 50-yr Correlations LgValPrem MidValPrem SmallValPrem
Large-Cap Value Premium 0.17 -0.01 0.04 0.11 Large Value Premium Pearson Correlation 1.00 .562** .523**
t-stat 0.61 -0.06 0.23 -0.80 Sig. (2-tailed) 0.00 0.00
Mid-Cap Value Premium Pearson Correlation .562** 1.00 .791**
Mid-Cap Value Premium 0.07 0.31 0.25 0.40 Sig. (2-tailed) 0.00 0.00
t-stat 0.34 0.98 1.13 2.45 Small-Cap Value Premium Pearson Correlation .523** .791** 1.00
Sig. (2-tailed) 0.00 0.00
Small-Cap Value Premium 0.22 0.55 0.61 0.77 ** Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed).
t-stat 0.66 1.98 3.04 5.11
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Appendix J: Russell And S&P Index Descriptions  
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Appendix K: Russell Style Results 
The small, mid, and large asset classifications were disaggregated to form nine new portfolios: small value, small 
neutral, small growth, mid value, mid neutral, mid growth, large value, large neutral, and large growth. This was done by 
forming sorts of stocks on market value and book-to-market value.  In December of each year from 1951 to 2014, all stocks 
are ranked on size using the Russell methodology to break the stocks into small, mid, and large.   
All the stocks are then divided into three different book to market categories based on the breakpoints  for the 
bottom 30% ( growth), middle 40% ( Neutral), and top 30% ( Value) of the ranked values of BE/ME for all stocks. Book value of 
common equity (BE) is defined similar to the Fama-French (1992) study, which uses the COMPUSTAT book value of 
stockholders equity plus balance-sheet deferred taxes minus book value of preferred stock.  The BE/ME represents the book 
common equity for the fiscal year ending in the calendar year divided by the market equity at the same time. 
 
Value
CAGR 10-yr 20-yr 30-yr 50-yr
Large-Cap Value 4.70      7.85      9.49      9.64      
Mid-Cap Value 9.12      12.49    13.33    13.60    
Small-Cap Value 8.82      14.69    14.76    17.13    
Std Dev 10-yr 20-yr 30-yr 50-yr
Large-Cap Value 18.38    18.01    16.94    15.85    
Mid-Cap Value 18.60    17.50    17.18    17.44    
Small-Cap Value 25.96    22.98    21.31    21.43    
Sharpe Ratio 10-yr 20-yr 30-yr 50-yr
Large-Cap Value 0.18      0.29      0.34      0.29      
Mid-Cap Value 0.41      0.56      0.56      0.49      
Small-Cap Value 0.29      0.52      0.52      0.56      
Risk Free ( 30 day T-Bill) 1.42     2.66     3.68     5.04     
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GROWTH
CAGR 10-yr 20-yr 30-yr 50-yr
Large-Cap Growth 7.67      7.93      10.06    8.04      
Mid-Cap Growth 8.49      7.41      9.17      7.61      
Small-Cap Growth 7.16      7.17      6.28      6.52      
Std Dev 10-yr 20-yr 30-yr 50-yr
Large-Cap Growth 13.88    16.59    16.80    16.93    
Mid-Cap Growth 17.39    22.11    20.94    21.04    
Small-Cap Growth 20.77    23.63    22.75    23.71    
Sharpe Ratio 10-yr 20-yr 30-yr 50-yr
Large-Cap Growth 0.45      0.32      0.38      0.18      
Mid-Cap Growth 0.41      0.21      0.26      0.12      
Small-Cap Growth 0.28      0.19      0.11      0.06      
Risk Free 1.42     2.66     3.68     5.04     
NEUTRAL
CAGR 10-yr 20-yr 30-yr 50-yr
Large-Cap Neutral 8.41      10.90    12.15    9.30         
Mid-Cap Neutral 10.33    10.90    11.74    10.88      
Small-Cap Neutral 8.83      12.51    12.42    12.89      
Std Dev 10-yr 20-yr 30-yr 50-yr
Large-Cap Neutral 13.94    15.06    14.80    15.18      
Mid-Cap Neutral 17.35    16.75    16.39    16.01      
Small-Cap Neutral 19.66    18.09    17.63    18.72      
Sharpe Ratio 10-yr 20-yr 30-yr 50-yr
Large-Cap Neutral 0.50      0.55      0.57      0.28         
Mid-Cap Neutral 0.51      0.49      0.49      0.36         
Small-Cap Neutral 0.38      0.54      0.50      0.42         
Risk Free ( 30 day T-Bill) 1.42     2.66     3.68     5.04        
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Appendix L: Migration By Style And Industry 
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Cons 
NonDur
Cons 
Durab Manuf Energy Chemical
Bus 
Equip Telecom Utilities
Ret & 
Whol 
Shops Healthcare Finance Other
Avg. Mkt 
Cap N
Total Large-Caps 5% 3% 13% 9% 6% 12% 7% 11% 5% 9% 14% 6% 22,798    7,677  
Total Vanishes 6% 2% 7% 11% 2% 8% 13% 5% 3% 12% 23% 8% 13,254    209      
    Total Mergers 6% 2% 7% 11% 2% 8% 15% 5% 3% 13% 21% 7% 13,093    203      
    Total Delistings 0% 0% 17% 17% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 50% 17% 0% 18,707    6          
Total Large to Mid 6% 3% 10% 6% 4% 14% 3% 11% 9% 4% 18% 10% 9,179       806      
-           
Cons 
NonDur
Cons 
Durab Manuf Energy Chemical
Bus 
Equip Telecom Utilities
et & 
Whol 
Shops Healthcare Finance Other
Wgt Avg 
Mkt Cap N
Postive Movement 6% 2% 7% 11% 2% 8% 15% 5% 3% 13% 21% 7% 13,093    203      
Negative Movement 6% 3% 10% 6% 4% 14% 3% 11% 9% 4% 19% 10% 9,249       812      
Positve Movement
Cons 
NonDur
Cons 
Durab Manuf Energy Chemical
Bus 
Equip Telecom Utilities
Ret & 
Whol 
Shops Healthcare Finance Other
Avg Mkt 
Cap   N
L/G 12% 2% 6% 6% 2% 14% 8% 6% 2% 29% 2% 10% 14,632    49        
L/N 6% 2% 9% 12% 3% 6% 9% 3% 6% 10% 22% 10% 10,288    86        
L/V 2% 2% 4% 13% 0% 6% 26% 7% 0% 0% 41% 0% 18,330    54        
Negative Movement
Cons 
NonDur
Cons 
Durab Manuf Energy Chemical
Bus 
Equip Telecom Utilities
Ret & 
Whol Healthcare Finance Other
Avg Mkt 
Cap N
L/G 11% 4% 6% 8% 5% 25% 3% 2% 9% 7% 6% 13% 6,456       232      
L/N 6% 3% 16% 4% 5% 13% 3% 8% 12% 4% 18% 8% 7,831       321      
L/V 2% 3% 8% 5% 3% 7% 2% 23% 7% 2% 30% 9% 9,163       259      
Large-Cap Stock Industry Movement (1980-2013)
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Appendix M: Four-Factor Model 
 
The following model was created based on four of the five research factors from the Ken 
French data library (French 2015) : (i) Mkt-RF is the excess return on the market, which is the value 
weighted returns of all firms in the CRSP less the one-month T-bill rate (ii) HML (High Minus Low) is 
the average return on the two value portfolios minus the average return on the two growth portfolios 
(iii) SMB (Small minus Big) is the average return on small-cap stock minus the average return on large-
cap stocks (iiii) Profit or as French calls it RMW ( Robust Minus Weak) is the average return of the 
small and large stocks with the highest operating profitability  per unit of book equity minus the 
average return of the small and large stocks with the lowest operating profitability per unit of book 
value.  Operating profitability is revenue less cost of goods sold, selling, general and administrative 
expenses or interest expense. 
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1980-2013 Constant Mkt-RF HML SMB Profit
Large Growth 0.45 0.96 -0.40 -0.28 0.11
Large Neutral 0.43 0.98 0.07 -0.23 0.07
Large Value 0.32 1.05 0.49 -0.27 -0.28
Mid Growth 0.45 1.05 -0.43 0.38 -0.22
Mid Neutral 0.29 1.04 0.24 0.24 0.15
Mid Value 0.31 1.07 0.61 0.20 0.10
Small Growth -0.04 1.11 -0.27 0.88 -0.08
Small Neutral 0.24 1.02 0.33 0.72 0.26
Small Value 0.45 1.10 0.70 0.84 0.04
Large- Cap 0.42 0.98 -0.01 -0.26 -0.02
Mid-Cap 0.36 1.04 0.13 0.27 -0.01
Small-Cap 0.21 1.04 0.16 0.78 -0.01
1980-2013 (t-stat) Constant Mkt-RF HML SMB Profit
Large Growth 5.9 54.7 -15.5 -10.0 3.2
Large Neutral 7.0 70.4 3.6 -10.7 2.4
Large Value 4.0 58.8 18.6 -9.5 -7.8
Mid Growth 5.1 52.5 -14.5 12.0 -5.4
Mid Neutral 4.0 63.8 10.0 9.2 4.6
Mid Value 3.6 53.5 20.7 6.2 2.5
Small Growth -0.5 67.3 -11.3 33.6 -2.4
Small Neutral 3.6 67.4 15.0 30.3 8.4
Small Value 3.8 40.5 17.4 19.6 0.8
Large- Cap 11.7 120.4 -0.9 -20.4 -1.3
Mid-Cap 6.1 77.6 6.4 12.7 -0.5
Small-Cap 3.8 82.3 8.5 39.1 -0.4
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